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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Annual Survey period saw an uprising by several Texas courts
of appeals against the "Mother Hubbard finality rule" of Mafrige
v. Ross' and its progeny.2 Calling the rule of Mafrige and Inglish3
"harsh" and "unfair," one court of appeals enforced the rule but urged
the Texas Supreme Court to reconsider the rule, and even recommended
that parties to a summary judgment proceeding never use a Mother Hub-
bard clause. 4 Several courts found unique ways "around" the rule. 5 One
of the more severe critics of the rule characterized it as a "benign growth
[in Mafrige] allowing review of unripe claims on appeal" that "became a
1. 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
2. See Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 988 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 988 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Midkiff v. Hancock East Texas Sanitation, Inc.,
996 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet. h.); Rodriguez v. NBC Bank, 5 S.W.3d
756 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
3. Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997).
4. See Lehmann, 988 S.W.2d at 418 (emphasis added).
5. See Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d 414; NBC Bank, 5 S.W.3d 756.
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malignant cancer [in Inglish] cutting off causes of action before trial."'6
Given the pervasiveness of the complaints about Mafrige and Inglish
among the courts of appeals, perhaps the supreme court should, as sug-
gested by one jurist, "lock Mother Hubbard in the cupboard and return
to the rule ... that a judgment is final and appealable only if it expressly
disposes of all parties and all claims in the case."'7
In the mandamus arena, the supreme court continued to apply the "ex-
ceptional circumstances" standard developed in past years, 8 but a rising
conflict apparently exists among the current members of the court over
when to apply the standard. Indeed, the court's decision in In re Mason-
ite9 highlighted this conflict. In Masonite, the court found exceptional cir-
cumstances and granted mandamus relief from a trial court's incidental
venue ruling to avoid wasting judicial resources. 10 Significantly, four jus-
tices dissented in Masonite, complaining that mandamus jurisdiction
should not extend to such incidental venue rulings. Since one justice did
not participate in the decision, the future application of the "exceptional
circumstances" standard is uncertain.
II. APPELLATE REVIEW BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
A. MANDAMUS
1. Mandamus Relief Available: Exceptional Circumstances
In recent years, the court has granted mandamus relief based on "ex-
ceptional" or "unique" circumstances even where an appellate remedy
may normally be available." In Masonite, a narrow majority of the court
found exceptional circumstances warranting mandamus relief from a trial
court order that improperly and sua sponte transferred venue of non-re-
sidents to sixteen different counties.'2
In Masonite, the plaintiffs conceded that their choice of venue for the
non-residents was not proper. Because plaintiffs' first choice of venue
was improper, the trial court had to "transfer venue to the county speci-
fied in the defendant's motion to transfer venue, provided that the defen-
dant ha[d] requested transfer to another county of proper venue.' 13
Masonite had requested such a transfer. Had the trial court transferred
venue to Dallas, as Masonite requested, the non-resident plaintiffs' claims
could have been resolved in a single lawsuit. Instead, the trial court, on
its own initiative, transferred venue for the non-resident plaintiffs to each
6. Adam, 988 S.W.2d at 427-48 (Taft, J., concurring).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding);
Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681-82 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
9. 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
10. See id. at 198-99.
11. See e.g., Alan Wright et al., Appellate Practice and Procedure, 50 SMU L. REV.
899, 903-10 (1997).
12. See Masonite, 997 S.W.2d at 198-99.
13. Id. at 197.
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of their respective counties of residence, resulting in sixteen separate
trials.
The court acknowledged that "venue determinations as a rule are not
reviewable by mandamus" and rejected Masonite's efforts to characterize
the trial court's improper transfer of venue as void.14 Nonetheless, the
majority found that "exceptional circumstances" justified mandamus re-
lief, basing its decision on the tremendous waste of judicial resources,
which would result from sixteen separate trials that would have to be
conducted with built-in reversible error.15 The court noted that "[a]ppeal
may be adequate for a particular party, but it is no remedy at all for the
irreversible waste of judicial and public resources that would be required
here if mandamus does not issue.' 16
In the dissent, Justice Baker, joined by Chief Justice Phillips, and Jus-
tices O'Neill and Gonzales, strongly criticized the majority for rejecting
"precedent on this specific issue, circumvent[ing] public policy, re-
treat[ing] to where the law was before Walker, and reinstat[ing] a princi-
ple of law Walker specifically disapproved. '17 The dissent warned that by
granting mandamus relief in this case the court had eviscerated the stan-
dards set forth in Walker in favor of granting mandamus relief "in each
case where reversible error exists, because doing so would certainly pre-
serve judicial and public resources. 1 8 The dissent further cautioned that
"mandamus should not issue simply because we disagree with the trial
court's ruling." 19
Notably, only three supreme court justices, including Justices Hecht,
Owen and Abbott, joined Justice Enoch in the majority opinion, while
four justices dissented. Justice Hankinson did not participate in the deci-
sion. Instead, the Honorable David Chew, Justice for the Eighth Court of
Appeals District, sat by commission and joined the majority. As a result,
it is unclear how the current court will apply the exceptional circum-
stances standard in the future.
2. Mandamus Relief Available: Mandatory Venue
In a case of first impression, the court recognized its original manda-
mus jurisdiction to enforce mandatory venue under section 15.0642 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.20 The court found in Continen-
tal Airlines that the mandatory venue provisions did not apply and that
no abuse of discretion occurred in denying the motions to transfer
14. Id. at 197-98.
15. Id. at 198.
16. Id. at 198.
17. Masonite, 997 S.W.2d at 200 (Baker, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 200-01.
19. Id. at 202.
20. See In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceed-
ing). Section 15.0642 provides in relevant part: "A party may apply for a writ of manda-
mus with an appellate court to enforce the mandatory venue provisions of this chapter."
TEX. CIV. P. & REM. CODE ANN. §15.0642 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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venue. 21 The court, therefore, did not consider "whether Section 15.0642
requires the Relators to establish any other of the usual prerequisites for
mandamus review."' 22 In In re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,23 however,
the court reached the question and held that "adequacy of an appellate
remedy is not a requisite of a mandatory venue mandamus under section
15.0642."24
3. Mandamus Relief Available: No Adequate Remedy by Appeal
a. Orders on Motions to Disqualify Opposing Counsel
In several cases before the court during this Annual Survey period, the
court granted mandamus to require disqualification of counsel. Consis-
tent with its opinion in National Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Godbey,25
the supreme court held in In re Epic Holdings, Inc. that there was no
adequate remedy by appeal for a trial court's failure to disqualify plain-
tiff's counsel, who had formerly represented the defendant in a substan-
tially related case. 26 Plaintiff's counsel's actions violated rule 1.09 of the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.27
Mandamus will also issue to correct a trial court's failure to disqualify
plaintiff's counsel after the plaintiff hired a legal assistant who had for-
merly worked on the same case for the defendants.28 In American Home,
plaintiff's counsel hired Diana Palacios to serve as a freelance consultant/
paralegal after confirming with her former employer (defense counsel)
that Ms. Palacios had not previously worked on matters related to the
Norplant litigation. Defendants subsequently sought to disqualify plain-
tiff's counsel because Ms. Palacios had in fact worked on the Norplant
litigation and possessed confidential and privileged information about the
defendants in that lawsuit. The court held that there was an irrebutable
presumption that Ms. Palacios, by working on the Norplant litigation for
the defendants' counsel, obtained confidential information about the de-
fendants and their defense.29 The court concluded that plaintiff's counsel
did not take "'sufficient precautions ... to guard against any disclosure of
confidences,"' 30 such as prohibiting Ms. Palacios from working on the
Norplant litigation. The court, therefore, conditionally granted manda-
21. See Continental Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 734-35.
22. Id. at 737.
23. 998 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
24. Id. at 216.
25. 924 S.W.2d 123, 133 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
26. 985 S.W.2d 41, 54 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
27. See id. at 54.
28. See In re American Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 82 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding).
29. See id. at 75.
30. Id. (quoting Grant v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 888 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding)). Sufficient precautions include (1) instructing the legal assistant "'not
to work on any matter on which the paralegal worked during the prior employment, or
regarding which the paralegal has information relating to the former employer's represen-
tation,' and (2) '[taking] other reasonable steps to ensure that the paralegal does not work
in connection with matters on which the paralegal worked during the prior employment,
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mus after finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel. 31
In the dissent, Justice Spector complained that the court's decision to
disqualify plaintiff's counsel was improper because "we cannot say that
the facts and the law in this case permit [the trial court] to reasonably
reach but one conclusion concerning Palacios' status. 32
Mandamus will also issue where a firm is improvidently disqualified
from representing a litigant.33 Rule 4.02(a) of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits an attorney from speaking with a
person that the "lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
....- 4 In Users System Services, the court of appeals found that plain-
tiff's counsel violated rule 4.02(a) and disqualified her because she met
with one of the defendants after that defendant stated in writing that he
was no longer represented by counsel. 35 The supreme court disagreed,
finding that plaintiff's counsel appropriately relied on the defendant's
representation that he was no longer represented by counsel. Therefore,
plaintiff's counsel did not violate any disciplinary rules. 36 The court also
noted that defense counsel's seven month delay in seeking disqualifica-
tion could be construed as waiver, but failed to address this issue because
plaintiff's counsel did not argue waiver and defense counsel had some
explanation for his delay.
Although mandamus will issue to correct a trial court's failure to dis-
qualify counsel, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to
disqualify counsel after counsel lists the opposing party's former consult-
ing expert as a testifying expert. 37 The court noted in American Home
that "if communications with an expert may be discovered during the
course of litigation by opposing counsel, that information cannot be con-
sidered confidential, and the fact that it has been shared with opposing
counsel cannot be the basis for disqualification. '38
b. Failure to Rule on a No-Evidence Summary Judgment
It is well-settled in Texas jurisprudence that mandamus is not available
from the denial of a motion for summary judgment, even under the new
no evidence summary judgment rules. 39 While recognizing this rule of
absent client consent."' Id. (quoting Phoeniz Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831,
835 (Tex. 1994)).
31. See id. at 82. The court refused, however, to disqualify plaintiff's co-counsel be-
cause defendants had failed to prove the relationship between plaintiff's co-counsel and
either Palacios or the disqualified counsel. See id.
32. Id. (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 822, 840 (Tex. 1992)).
33. See In re Users Sys. Servs., Inc., No. 98-0806, 1999 WL 417312 (Tex. June 24, 1999)
(orig. proceeding).
34. TEX. Disc. R. PROF. CONDucr 4.02(a).
35. See Users, 1999 WL 417312 at *1-2.
36. See id. at *3-5.
37. See American Home, 985 S.W.2d at 73-74.
38. Id. at 73.
39. See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566-67 (Tex. 1985); In re Mission Consol. In-
dep. Sch. Dist., 990 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding).
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law, the Texarkana Court of Appeals nonetheless found in Mohawk that
the trial court had applied the wrong standard to the no evidence sum-
mary judgment. And "for the guidance of the trial court in ruling on
future motions for summary judgment" (which the court urged the par-
ties to file), the court "set out the proper application and interpretation of
the no-evidence summary judgment rule in the context of this case."'40 As
a result, the court effectively granted the defendants the relief they re-
quested without expressly exercising its mandamus jurisdiction.
Moreover, although mandamus relief is not available from the denial of
summary judgment, mandamus will issue to order a trial court to rule on
a no evidence motion for summary judgment "within a reasonable
time."141 In Mission, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals noted that the
new no evidence summary judgment's purpose of enabling "the movant
to file the equivalent of a motion for directed verdict at the pretrial stage
of the lawsuit" is thwarted "unless the trial court rules on the motion. '42
Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court's failure to rule on a
no evidence motion eight months after the motion was filed and seven
months after the court heard the motion was unreasonable, especially
where the plaintiff failed to respond to the motion.43
c. Orders Requiring Production of Trade Secrets
Reaffirming its holding in Walker v. Packer,44 the court concluded that
a party has no adequate remedy by appeal for an order requiring the
party to "produce privileged, trade secret information. '45 Rule 507 of the
Texas Rules of Evidence protects a party's trade secrets from discovery. 46
In Continental General Tire, the court held that "when a party resisting
discovery establishes that the requested information is a trade secret
under Rule 507, the burden shifts to the requesting party to establish that
the information is necessary for a fair adjudication of its claim or de-
fense."'47 Because the party seeking disclosure of Continental General
Tire's trade secrets did not prove necessity of disclosure of the privileged
information, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure
and mandamus was conditionally granted.48
See also In re Mohawk Rubber Co., 982 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig.
proceeding).
40. Mohawk, 982 S.W.2d at 497.
41. Mission, 990 S.W.2d at 461.
42. Id.
43. See id.
44. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
45. In re Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, 615 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding).
46. Rule 507 provides: "A person has a privilege ... to refuse to disclose and to pre-
vent other persons from disclosing a trade secret owned by the person ...... TEX. R. EvID.
507.
47. 979 S.W.2d at 610.
48. See id. at 615.
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d. Orders Entered Without Jurisdiction
i. Orders Entered after Plenary Power Expires
Mandamus will also issue to correct a trial court order granting a new
trial, entered fifteen days after the court's plenary power has expired,
because there is no adequate remedy by appeal for "a subsequent retrial"
over which the trial court has no jurisdiction.49
ii. Orders Assuming Continuing and Exclusive Jurisdiction under
the Texas Family Code
The district courts in Bexar County operate under a centralized docket
system that allows for "serial assignment of different judges to hear multi-
ple matters in the same suit affecting the parent-child relationship. '50
The Texas Family Code requires that a single court maintain continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over suits affecting the parent-child relationship
(SAPCR). 51 In Garza, the San Antonio Court of Appeals decided the
question of whether the Family Code's requirement that a single court
maintain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a SAPCR rendered an
order signed by a judge from a non-SAPCR court void under Bexar
County's centralized docket system.5 2
In Garza, Judge Specia assumed exclusive jurisdiction over a SAPCR
after another judge had entered a final judgment in the case. On manda-
mus, relators complained that because Judge Specia was not the judge in
the court where the final judgment was entered, he lacked authority
under the Family Code to assume jurisdiction over the SAPCR post-judg-
ment. The San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that the rotating
docket system in Bexar County complies with the Texas Constitution 53
and the Government Code54 provisions permitting the presiding judge to
49. See In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam). See In re Rollins Leasing, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, orig. proceeding).
50. In re Garza, 981 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, orig.
proceeding).
51. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §155.001(a) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). Specifically,
§155.001(a) provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a court acquires continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the matters provided for by this subtitle in connec-
tion with a child on the rendition of a final order .... (c) If a court of this
state has acquired continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, no other court of this
state has jurisdiction with regard to that child ....
Id.
52. See Garza, 981 S.W.2d at 438.
53. Article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution provides in relevant part that "the
District Judges may exchange districts or hold courts for each other when they may deem it
expedient..." TEX. CONST. art. V, §11.
54. Section 24.139(c) of the Government Code gives the district courts in Bexar
County concurrent jurisdiction. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 24.139(c) (Vernon 1988 &
Supp.). Section 74.094(a) provides:
A district ... court judge may hear and determine a matter pending in any
district.., court in the county regardless of whether the matter is preliminary
or final or whether there is a judgment or order in the matter. The judgment,
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assign cases to available judges.5 5 The court further held that Judge
Specia was acting as judge for the court that entered the final judgment
and that, therefore, he had authority to act under the Family Code.56 Be-
cause Judge Specia had jurisdiction, mandamus would not issue.57 None-
theless, the San Antonio Court of Appeals expressed grave concern for
the effect of the Bexar County rotating docket system on SAPCRs, stat-
ing that "[w]hile the Bexar County system appears to be quite efficient in
moving cases, it has not adapted to the spirit of the Family Code's exclu-
sive jurisdiction statute and the public policy purposes intended to be
served by it. '"58
iii. Failure to Recognize Jurisdiction to Grant a New Trial
Mandamus will also issue where a trial court refuses to grant a new trial
solely because the court incorrectly believes that its plenary jurisdiction
has expired. 59 In Barber, the parties submitted an agreed order to set
aside a default judgment and grant a new trial. After granting the new
trial, the original judge suffered a heart attack and was replaced as presid-
ing judge. A dispute arose as to whether the original judge ever signed
the order granting a new trial. The successor judge concluded that the
order granting a new trial had not been signed and that he did not have
jurisdiction to grant a new trial because plenary power had expired.
Finding that a rubber-stamped signature on a file-stamped copy of the
order granting a new trial, entered by the trial court's clerk at the direc-
tion of the trial court, constitutes a "signature" by the trial court, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that the judge did not timely sign the agreed order. 60 Moreover,
the court noted that although the signed copy was not placed in the
court's file, the date of signing rather than the date of entry controls
whether the order is timely signed. 6'
The court recognized that the proper means of attacking a default judg-
ment after plenary power expires by restricted appeal or equitable bill of
review. But, the court acknowledged that the relator in this case did not
seek to overturn a default judgment: they had already accomplished that
task. Rather, relators challenged the "trial court's refusal to acknowledge
the validity of its own order."'62 The court held that "[u]nder these
unique circumstances, because [relators] had no other means of obtaining
order, or action is valid and binding as if the case were pending in the court
of the judge who acts in the matter.
Id.




59. See In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
60. See id. at 367.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 368.
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this specific review, mandamus relief is appropriate. '63
In the dissent, Justice Baker, joined by Justice Spector, complained that
the court had ignored the disputed facts regarding whether the trial court
had authorized its signature on the order granting a new trial and warned
that the court was substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.
64
e. Orders Denying Arbitration
Consistent with a decision reviewed in last year's Annual Survey,65 the
Texas Supreme Court reconfirmed that there is no adequate remedy by
appeal for the improper denial of a motion to compel arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act.6 6
f. Orders to Reinstate
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief to cor-
rect a trial court's void orders that reinstated a case against a non-suited
defendant and sanctioned that defendant for discovery abuses.67 In Si-
mon, the plaintiffs dropped certain defendants from the pleadings based
on an affidavit from defendants' counsel that they did not own any part of
the property at issue in the case. Six months later and more than thirty
days after the final judgment was signed, plaintiffs sought to reinstate
their case against the defendants after learning that the non-suited de-
fendants may have lied about their interests in the property. The trial
court granted the motion to reinstate.
On mandamus, the court of appeals found that the amended pleading
omitting the non-suited defendant "eliminated the need for an order dis-
missing [the defendant] pursuant to the nonsuit.' '68 Accordingly, the
court concluded that a motion to reinstate filed six months after the non-
suit was untimely.69 As a result, the trial court's orders reinstating the
non-suited defendant and imposing sanctions were entered without juris-
diction and were, therefore, void. 70 The court rejected claims that man-
damus relief should be denied because the non-suited defendant
committed fraud in inducing the plaintiffs to dismiss it from the lawsuit
because the allegations of fraud were disputed and the subject of appeal.
The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims of laches, even though the de-
fendants waited a year and a half after the reinstatement to file the man-
damus petition, because the plaintiffs had failed to show "any detrimental
63. Id.
64. See id. at 369-70.
65. See Alan Wright et al., Appellate Practice and Procedure, 52 SMU L. REV. 717,
723-24 (1999).
66. See Okayed Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam).
67. See In re Simon Prop. Group (Delaware), Inc., 985 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding).
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 215.
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good faith change in their position resulting from the delay. '71
g. Orders Overruling Objections to Visiting Judges
As in the previous Annual Survey periods, 72 the court continues to re-
solve by mandamus the scope of a party's right to object to a visiting
judge under section 74.053(b) of the Texas Government Code. 73 In Per-
ritt, the court decided whether chapter 74 of the Government Code gives
a party the right to object to the assignment under rule 18a of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure to the assignment of a judge to hear a recusal
motion. The court concluded that even though the presiding judge's pro-
cedure for assigning a judge to hear a recusal motion derives from Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 18a (which does not address objections to the
assigned judge), the authority to assign judges to hear such motions is
derived from chapter 74 of the Government Code. 74 Accordingly, the
Texas Supreme Court held that the trial judge abused its discretion in
overruling the timely objection to his assignment to hear the recusal mo-
tion and conditionally granted mandamus. 75
h. Case Management and Discovery Orders
Quoting In re American Optical Corp.,76 the court acknowledged in In
re Alford Chevrolet-Geo,77 that "an order compelling discovery that is
well outside the proper bounds is reviewable by mandamus. ' 78 But, the
court found that the trial court's failure to issue a protective order and
discovery plan that limited pre-class certification discovery to information
necessary for the class certification issue was not an abuse of discretion
because the defendants failed to show that the requested discovery raised
issues that were clearly segregable from the question of class certifica-
tion. 79 In the dissent, Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, warned that
the majority opinion in Alford improperly placed the burden on the de-
fendant to identify what discovery is appropriate in the class certification
phase of the proceedings. 80
In In re Mohawk Rubber Co.,8' the Texarkana Court of Appeals
granted mandamus relief directing "the trial court to issue a new case
71. Id. at 216. Mandamus will also issue to correct a county court judge's reinstate-
ment of a justice court's judgment from which defendants had appealed to the county
court. See In re Garza, 990 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig.
proceeding).
72. See Wright, supra note 65, at 725-26.
73. See In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
74. See id. at 447.
75. See id.
76. 988 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
77. 997 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
78. Id. at 176 (quoting In re American Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d at 713).
79. See id. at 185.
80. See id. at 190 (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("This Court has
never before today assigned the responsibility for determining appropriate discovery to a
defendant filing a motion for protection.").
81. 982 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, orig. proceeding).
[Vol. 53
APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
management order" because its initial order arbitrarily lengthened "the
time for a group of plaintiffs to file a discovery response on the issue of
causation without. a showing of good cause."'8 2
i. Abatement of Proceedings
In Vanguard Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Smith,8 3 the Amarillo Court
of Appeals granted mandamus relief to enforce a contractual agreement
to submit an insurance claim for appraisal and to abate the lawsuit pend-
ing the appraisal.8 4
j. Elections
Although appellate courts lack mandamus jurisdiction over county offi-
cials,8 5 the legislature has expressly extended mandamus jurisdiction "to
resolve election questions. '86 Nonetheless, mandamus will not issue to
require the commissioners court to place a proposal on the election ballot
where the proposal arguably exceeds its statutory limits.8 7
k. Orders Denying Legislative Continuance
Section 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code man-
dates that a court continue a case "in which a party applying for the con-
tinuance or the attorney for that party applying for the continuance or
the attorney for that party is a member of the legislature and will be or is
attending a legislative session" within thirty days. 88 Although courts have
applied a narrow due process exception to section 30.003 where the con-
tinuance will cause irreparable harm to the opposing party, this exception
should be applied only in narrow instances.8 9 Thus, even where a party
may have hired an attorney who is also a legislator for the purpose of
obtaining a continuance, mandamus will issue to correct a trial court's
denial of the application for the mandatory legislative continuance. 90
4. Mandamus Relief Unavailable: Adequate Remedy by Appeal
a. Orders Denying Summary Judgment
As a general rule, mandamus relief is not available for the denial of a
motion for summary judgment.91 In In re Lee,92 the relator attempted to
circumvent this general rule by claiming an absolute privilege from suit
82. Id. at 499.
83. 999 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, orig. proceeding).
84. See id.
85. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §22.221(b) (Vernon Supp. 1998 & Supp. 2000).
86. In re Bailey, 975 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, orig. proceeding).
87. See id.
88. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.003 (Vernon 1997).
89. See In re Star Produce Co., 988 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999,
orig. proceeding).
90. See id. at 811-12.
91. See Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1985).
92. 995 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
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warranting immediate mandamus relief. The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals rejected this argument, finding that the attorneys' privilege from
defamation claims for statements made during the representation of a cli-
ent is in the nature of an affirmative defense and does not serve as an
absolute privilege against suit.93 Moreover, the court noted that in cases
of absolute privilege from suit, the legislature has provided for interlocu-
tory appeal, not mandamus. 94 As a result, mandamus will not issue from
the denial of a motion for summary judgment.
b. Orders Sustaining a Contest to an Affidavit of Indigence
Mandamus is no longer the appropriate means of challenging a trial
court's order sustaining a contest to an affidavit of indigence. 95 Prior to
1997, the Texas Supreme Court consistently held that because a party had
to pay appellate costs in advance to invoke the appellate court's jurisdic-
tion, an indigent party had no adequate remedy by appeal from an order
sustaining a contest to the affidavit of indigence. 96 In Arroyo, however,
the supreme court held that the 1997 amendments to the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure created an adequate remedy by appeal for the indi-
gent party.97 Specifically, the court noted that Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 25.1(a) provides for perfection of the appeal with a simple fil-
ing of notice of appeal; no cost bond is required. 98 An indigent party
cannot afford to pay the costs of preparation of the clerk's record and
reporter's record, and the rules provide that the appeal may be dismissed
if a party required to arrange for payment and preparation of the appel-
late record fails to do so.99 Nonetheless the court noted that (consistent
with previous mandamus practice) the court of appeals "can and should,
on motion or its own initiative, require the clerk and the court reporter
under Rules 34.5(c)(1) and 34.6(d), respectively, to prepare and file the
portions of the record necessary to review an order sustaining a contest to
an affidavit of indigence."'100 If the court of appeals reverses the order
sustaining a contest to an affidavit of indigence, the indigent appellant
may "obtain a full record under Rules 34.5(c)(1) and 34.6(d)" and supple-
93. See id. at 776.
94. Compare In re Mohawk Rubber Co., 982 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1998, orig. proceeding) (finding no mandamus jurisdiction over denial of motion for sum-
mary judgment but nonetheless reaching merits of trial court's ruling) and In re Mission
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 990 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceed-
ing) (recognizing lack of jurisdiction over no evidence summary judgment but exercising
mandamus jurisdiction over the trial court's failure to rule on summary judgment motion).
95. See In re Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
96. See, e.g., In re Jones, 966 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam).
97. See Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d at 739.
98. See also In re Price, 998 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, orig. proceeding)
(finding adequate remedy by appeal for district court's denial of relator's petition for writ
of mandamus from Justice of Peace court's refusal to permit appeal to district court with-
out posting appeal bond).
99. See Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d at 738 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 35.3; 37.3(b)).
100. Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d at 739.
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ment the briefing under rule 38.7.101
c. Orders Denying Motion to Compel Privileged Documents
The Houston First District Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief
from the denial of a motion to compel production of privileged docu-
ments because the relator failed to prove that exclusion of the requested
evidence prohibited it from establishing its claim and that a trial would,
therefore, waste judicial resources. 10 2
5. Mandamus Relief Unavailable: Non-Judicial Acts
a. Acts by the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
The Texas Supreme Court does not have direct mandamus jurisdiction
over the refusal by a member of the Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL)
Committee to produce information. 10 3 In Nolo Press, UPL subcommit-
tee refused to produce certain information regarding its investigation of
Nolo Press's publication of certain legal related software. Nolo Press
filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Texas Supreme Court seek-
ing to compel the UPL Committee to produce certain information. The
court held that it lacked mandamus jurisdiction over the UPL Commit-
tee.10 4 Specifically, the court noted that the court's mandamus jurisdic-
tion under article V, section 3 of the Texas Constitution did not apply
unless "a lower court's action threatens to impair [the Court's] appellate
jurisdiction or nullify the effect of our judgments."'1 5 The court further
concluded that UPL Committee members did not fall "within the small
circle [of officers of the state government] to which Section 22.002(a) [of
the Texas Government Code] refers."' 0 6 Finally, the court concluded that
its inherent powers to regulate the bar were administrative rather than
jurisdictional and such administrative powers "imply no mandamus juris-
diction. °10 7 Accordingly, mandamus relief was denied.10 8
b. Acts by the District Clerk
In In re Simpson, Jr.,109 the Waco Court of Appeals held that it lacked
jurisdiction over a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district clerk
to accept a motion for filing.110 After reviewing section 22.221 of the
Government Code, the court concluded that the "Government Code
101. Id.
102. See In re Kellogg Brown & Root, 7 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, orig. proceeding).
103. See In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 776 (Tex. 1999) (orig.
proceeding).
104. See id. at 775-76.
105. Id. at 775.
106. Id. at 776.
107. Id.
108. See id.




does not confer mandamus jurisdiction over District Clerks upon the
courts of appeals."' I'
c. Acts by the City Attorney
The Houston First District Court of Appeals similarly denied a petition
for writ of mandamus seeking to "compel the city attorney of Pasadena,
Texas to comply with [a] request under the Texas Open Records Act""12
because it does not have "original mandamus authority against a city at-
torney," or "original mandamus jurisdiction under the Open Records
Act."113
6. Mandamus Practice and Procedure
a. Standard of Review
In the mandamus context, the trial court's actions are traditionally re-
viewable only for an abuse of discretion. Under this standard, the court
does not engage in a factual sufficiency review. In Epic, 4 the Texas Su-
preme Court examined whether former members of a law firm who were
working for the firm at the time it represented Epic Holdings, Inc. in its
formation were disqualified from representing an Epic employee against
Epic's CEO. On the tenth day of trial, defendants reurged their motion
to disqualify after plaintiff's counsel stated that he intended to make an
issue at trial of the former law firm's representation of EPIC's directors.
Based on this statement by plaintiff's counsel, the court found that the
former law firm had represented EPIC and the individual directors, that
the present lawsuit was adverse to that previous representation, and that
the former representation was substantially related to the matters in the
present lawsuit' ' 5 The court further concluded that because plaintiff's
counsel did not place the question of the former law firm's representation
of EPIC and the directors at issue until trial, defendants had not waived
their right to seek disqualification by filing their motion to disqualify dur-
ing trial.' 1 6
In the dissent, Justice Baker, joined by Justices Gonzalez and Spector,
complained that the majority had improperly engaged in a factual suffi-
ciency review of the evidence in overruling the trial court's finding of
waiver of the disqualification issue. Justices Enoch and Hankinson did
not participate in the opinion, leaving, therefore, only four of the current
justices in accord with the opinion and three dissenting from it.
1ll. Id.
112. TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 552.021 (Vernon Supp. 1999).
113. In re Turner, 998 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceed-
ing) (per curiam).
114. 985 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998).
115. See id. at 50-52.
116. See id. at 52-53.
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b. Alternative Administrative Relief
In Nolo Press,'17 relators requested that in the alternative to manda-
mus relief the court consider relators' petition as an administrative matter
and either (1) direct the UPL Committee to produce the requested infor-
mation or (2) declare that the court's 1986 order regarding the authority
of the UPL Committee to maintain the confidentiality of certain informa-
tion confidential does not preclude production of information to relators.
The court held that it lacked mandamus jurisdiction over relators' peti-
tion and denied mandamus relief. But it accepted relators' invitation to
clarify its 1986 order regarding retention of confidential information by
the UPL Committee, analyzed the effect of the 1986 order in light of the
court's recent promulgation of rule 12 of the Rules of Judicial Adminis-
tration governing the confidentiality of all judicial records, and vacated its
1986 order.' 18 In a concurring opinion, Justice Enoch warned that vacat-
ing the court's 1986 order in response to relators' mandamus petition was
premature because it (1) allowed relators to "pretermit a plaintiff's suit
and the orderly application of the discovery rules through a mandamus
action" and (2) altered an administrative rule "without any comment on
the proposed changes from the UPL Committee members or any other
interested persons."' 19
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Appeal From Order on Motion to Transfer Venue and/or Order
Granting/Denying Joinder or Intervention When Venue Is
a Factor
In Surgitek v. Abel,120 the Texas Supreme Court held that a court of
appeals may exercise jurisdiction under section 15.003(c)121 to review a
venue transfer order that necessarily rested on the trial court's determi-
nation of the propriety of joinder under section 15.003(a). Ordinarily, a
court of appeals may not immediately review a trial court order transfer-
ring venue. Section 15.003(c), however, allows any party aggrieved by a
trial court's determination of a section 15.003(a) joinder issue to contest
the decision by an interlocutory appeal.
An issue arises when the order appealed is a venue transfer order fol-
lowing a motion to transfer venue. The Texarkana Court of Appeals
117. In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc. 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999).
118. See id. at 778-79, 783-85.
119. Id. at 782.
120. 997 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1999).
121. Section 15.003(c) provides:
Any person seeking intervention or joinder, who is unable to independently
establish proper venue, or a party opposing intervention or joinder of such a
person may contest the decision of the trial court allowing or denying inter-
vention or joinder by taking an interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals
district in which the trial court is located under the procedures established
for interlocutory appeals.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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adopted a formalistic approach in Shubert v. J.C. Penney Co. and held
that, even if the lower court's decision to transfer venue was based on the
propriety of the plaintiffs' joinder, a venue order is not appealable. 122
The supreme court disapproved of this approach because it "would allow
defendants to dictate at the outset, simply by how they style their request
for relief, whether a plaintiff could pursue an interlocutory appeal."'1 23
Reasoning that "[w]e should not be so constrained by the form or caption
of a pleading," the court held that "[b]ecause the trial court's venue trans-
fer order in this case was predicated on its decision about the propriety of
the plaintiff's joinder under section 15.003(a), the court of appeals had
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal.' 24
2. Appeal From Order Allowing or Denying Intervention
During the Annual Survey period, two courts of appeals have inter-
preted section 15.003(c) 125 to permit interlocutory appeal from a decision
allowing or denying joinder only when a plaintiff is unable to indepen-
dently establish proper venue. 126 If a plaintiff establishes venue indepen-
dently from section 15.003(a), no interlocutory appeal is permitted under
section 15.003(c). For example, in American Home Products Corp. v.
Clark, the district court's order denying the defendants' motions chal-
lenging joinder and venue failed to state whether the plaintiffs had inde-
pendently established proper venue under section 15.002 or were
properly joined under section 15.003. Accordingly, the court of appeals
abated the cause and directed the lower court to prepare a revised order
specifying the basis for its decision so that it could evaluate the plaintiff's
jurisdictional challenge. 127 The revised order stated that the plaintiffs
had independently established venue under sections 15.002(a)(2) and
15.005 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Accordingly, the
court held that "[b]ecause the court found that each plaintiff had inde-
pendently established venue and because the court did not reach the join-
der question, section 15.003(c) cannot be the jurisdictional basis for this
appeal."' 28
122. See 956 S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1997, pet. denied).
123. Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 601.
124. Id.
125. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
126. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 999 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. App.-Waco
1999, pet. filed); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Goldston, 983 S.W.2d 369, 374 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1998, pet. dism'd by agr.).
127. See American Home, 999 S.W.2d at 909.
128. Id. at 910; see also Bristol-Myers, 983 S.W.2d at 374 ("Section 15.003(c) does not
provide for an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's determination that a person seek-
ing intervention or joinder has independently established proper venue."). The dissent in
American Home would not have dismissed the appeal because the defendant asked for and
was denied relief under section 15.003. See American Home, 999 S.W.2d at 911.
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3. Appeal From Order Granting or Refusing a Temporary Injunction
As confirmed by the Austin Court of Appeals in Qwest Communica-
tions International v. AT&T Corp. "[a]n appeal cannot be taken from an
otherwise non-appealable order by seeking to disguise it as a temporary
injunction. 1 29 The use of words such as "desist and refrain" does not
compel a finding that the order is a temporary injunction.' 30 Accord-
ingly, because the order at issue in Qwest did not satisfy the traditional
criteria for a temporary injunction, it was more properly characterized as
an unappealable interlocutory order enforcing an agreement of compro-
mise and settlement between the parties.13'
Similarly, in Bobbit v. Cantu, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a
party does not make an otherwise unappealable interlocutory order re-
viewable by piggy-backing it onto an appeal of an order granting or refus-
ing a temporary injunction. 132 The order in that case granted partial
summary judgment for the appellee and temporarily enjoined the appel-
lant from going onto the appellee's property until after trial. Because the
substance of appellant's points of error attacked the grant of partial sum-
mary judgment and not the temporary injunction, the court held that the
appellant had "attempt[ed] to appeal an otherwise unappealable order by
joining it with an appeal of a temporary injunction" and, therefore, the
issue would not be resolved until final judgment.133
4. Appeal From Order Denying a Governmental Unit's Motion
Challenging Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits
an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a governmental unit's plea to
the jurisdiction challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction. 134 In
Harlandale Independent School District v. Hernandez, 35 the San Antonio
court of appeals exercised its appellate jurisdiction to review the denial of
a school district's motion to dismiss based on the plaintiff's failure to
comply with existing grievance procedure before filing a whistleblower
action against the school district. The court reasoned that the denial of
the interlocutory motion to dismiss was appealable under section
129. 983 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. filed); see also Elm Creek Villas
Homeowner Ass'n, Inc. v. Beldon Roofing & Remodeling Co., 940 S.W.2d 150, 154 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ). See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4)
("A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a district court.., that ... appoints
a receiver or trustee.").
130. See Qwest, 983 S.W.2d at 888.
131. See id. at 889.
132. See 992 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.); see also Browne v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 766 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); City of
Arlington v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 540 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950)).
133. Id. at 713.
134. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
135. 994 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
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51.014(a)(8) because the motion challenged to the court's subject matter
jurisdiction.
5. Appeal From Order Denying Class Decertification
In Texas, an interlocutory appeal is available from an order certifying
or refusing to certify a class action. 136 If a party fails to appeal an original
order of class certification, however, it may not thereafter seek immediate
appellate review of subsequent orders overruling its motion for decertifi-
cation and motion to withdraw the original order.137 Moreover, although
an order that fundamentally restructures a class can be appealed under
section 51.014(a)(3), 38 an order granting partial summary judgment on
liability cannot be said to fundamentally restructure a class when it
neither changes the class members' ability to opt-out nor creates a con-
flict among class members. 139
6. Appeal From Order Granting New Trial
A trial court's order granting a new trial during the plenary period is
not subject to review either by direct appeal from the order or from a
final judgment after further proceedings in the trial court.' 40 Likewise, a
party is not entitled to interlocutory review of that order when the point
is raised as a cross-appeal. 141
7. Appeal From Order Denying Motion to Terminate Temporary
Conservatorship
The Texas Family Code permits the appeal of a "final order" in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship. 142 A final order is one that deter-
mines the rights of the parties and disposes of all the issues involved so
that no further action will be necessary in order to settle and determine
the case.143 In re N.J.G. involved the appeal of an order denying a mo-
tion to terminate a temporary conservatorship of a child. Although
neither party challenged the appellate court's jurisdiction, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that because the trial court's order effec-
tively continued the temporary appointment of a managing conservator
and left open the question of permanent conservatorship, that order was
interlocutory. 144 Accordingly, the N.J.G. court dismissed the appeal for
136. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
137. See Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 2 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio May 12, 1999, pet. filed).
138. See De Los Santos v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 933 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. 1996).
139. See Bally, 2 S.W.3d at 330-31.
140. See Wolk v. Life Partners, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.)
(quoting Cummins v. Paisan Const. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984)).
141. See id. at 935 (granting appellant's motion to dismiss cross-appeal but denying ap-
pellant's motion seeking sanctions for frivolous appeal).
142. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (Vernon 1999).
143. See In re N.J.G., 980 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (quoting
Kelley v. Kelley, 583 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1979, writ dism'd)).
144. See In re N.J.G., 980 S.W.2d at 767.
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lack of jurisdiction.
8. Supreme Court Jurisdiction Over Interlocutory Appeals
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Celebrity, Inc., the
Texas Supreme Court held that the Texas Arbitration Act does not inde-
pendently grant the supreme court jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an
interlocutory order denying arbitration.145 Supreme court jurisdiction
over interlocutory orders is governed by section 22.225(b)(3) of the Gov-
ernment Code, which allows review only when there is a dissent or con-
flict in the court of appeals.1 46 Although the Texas Legislature can enact
exceptions to that rule, the Texas Arbitration Act is not such an excep-
tion.1 47 The Texas Arbitration Act provides that an appeal from an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration "shall be taken in the manner and
to the same extent as an appeal from an order or judgment in a civil
action."'1 48 The court held that, because "this language does not expressly
or implicitly grant this Court jurisdiction[,] ... we do not have jurisdiction
over appeals under the Texas Arbitration Act in the absence of either a
dissent in the court of appeals or the court of appeals holding differently
than a prior decision of another court of appeals or this Court. '149
Because there was no dissent in the court of appeals, appellate review
of that case was proper only if there was a conflict. The appellant argued
that the court of appeals' decision conflicted with the Dallas Court of
Appeals' decision in Gaulden v. Johnson and "the well-recognized policy
of Texas courts in favor of arbitration." 150 The court rejected both argu-
ments, however, holding that the court of appeals did not hold differently
than the Gaulden court and that "a conflict with a general 'policy' is not
sufficient to establish that the court of appeals held differently than an-
other court of appeals or this Court."' 5'
9. Appeal From Order Appointing a Receiver
In Swate v. Johnson, the Houston First District Court of Appeals con-
firmed that "an interlocutory order appointing a successor to a perma-
nent receiver is not appealable" under section 51.014(a)(1) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 152
145. See Celebrity, 988 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1998).
146. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.225(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
147. See Celebrity, 988 S.W.2d at 732-33.
148. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.098(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
149. Celebrity, 988 S.W.2d at 733.
150. Id. (citing Gaulden v. Johnson, 801 S.W.2d 561, 563-65 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
writ denied)).
151. Id.
152. 981 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1998, no pet.).
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III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A. TRIAL COURT
1. Timely Complaints to the Trial Court
a. Objections in the Trial Court
Rule 33.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a
party must make a timely complaint to the trial court as a "prerequisite to
presenting a complaint for appellate review."'1 53 As a result, a party must
expressly object or move to strike expert testimony and explain the rea-
sons for the motion or objection "before trial or when the evidence is
offered" or any complaint about the expert evidence is waived. 154 A
party must also raise objections to the form of an affidavit, including ob-
jections to the lack of personal knowledge to support statements in an
affidavit, in the trial court or the objection is waived. 155 Moreover, a
party who fails to object to the lack of verification of a supplemental in-
terrogatory answer for thirteen months and before the commencement of
trial waives any objection. 156
To complain on appeal that the trial court failed to submit instructions
to the jury on necessary elements of a claim, at least one court has held
that it is sufficient for the complaining party to object to the omission and
refer to the proper instruction from the Texas Pattern Jury Charges, with-
out submitting the instruction in writing and obtaining a written ruling. 157
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court held that a lessor in an oil and gas
lease properly preserves its complaint that a breach of duty to protect
against drainage on leases must be predicated on a finding that the pool-
ing of units was in bad faith by: (1) moving to bifurcate the issues of
drainage and pooling; (2) objecting to the trial court's proposed charge
and suggesting a proper submission; and (3) objecting at the formal
charge conference and reurging the request for bifurcation of the is-
sues. 158 Notably, the court found that the objections raised in response to
the trial court's request for a proposed charge "alone would be insuffi-
cient to preserve the issue," but concluded that reurging these objections
during the formal charge conference "properly preserved error on the
issue."159
A party need not raise issues of law at the charge conference, however,
to satisfy the preservation requirements of rule 33.1.160 Issues of law,
153. TEX. R. App. P. 33.1 (Vernon 1997).
154. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Denton Cent. Appraisal Dist., 999 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1999, no pet.).
155. See Harris v. Spires Council of Co-Owners, 981 S.W.2d 892, 896 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
156. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morua, 979 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. 1998).
157. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Garcia, 988 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, no pet.).
158. See Southeastern Pipe Line Co., Inc. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 173 (Tex. 1999).
159. Id. Compare Green Tree, 988 S.W.2d at 782 (finding it sufficient to raise the ab-
sence of an instruction on the record at the informal charge conference).
160. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie, 997 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1999).
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such as the question of whether a party is legally entitled to recover com-
pensatory and punitive damages in a wrongful discharge case, are pre-
served if raised in a written response to the plaintiff's motion for
judgment on the verdict.161 Similarly, a "no evidence" challenge to the
jury's findings of DTPA violations is sufficient to preserve an argument
that no implied warranty arose under the facts. 162 Moreover, a party
does not invite error by seeking limiting instructions or otherwise ob-
jecting to the form of the jury submission that the party believes should
not be submitted as a matter of law.163
Finally, although a party who delays in seeking disqualification may
waive the right to disqualify opposing counsel, a party's failure to urge a
motion that should have been denied at the time it was filed will not
prohibit that party from "reurging the motion when it should have been
granted. 1 64
b. Obtaining a Ruling
Rule 33.1 does not require a party to obtain a written ruling from the
trial court in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Rather, rule 33.1 "re-
laxes the former requirement of an express ruling and codifies case law
that recognized implied rulings. 1 65 Thus, where a party raises specific
objections and moves to strike plaintiff's evidence filed in response to a
no evidence summary judgment motion and the trial court states in its
order that it reviewed all competent summary judgment evidence, there is
an "inference that the court implicitly sustained the objections to the
evidence."166
c. Requesting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
During the Annual Survey period, the Houston First District Court of
Appeals reaffirmed in Frommer v. Frommer167 the dire consequences on
appeal of failing to request findings of fact and conclusions of law. When
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not requested, the court held,
"the appellate court presumes that the trial court made all necessary find-
ings to support its judgment.' 68 In determining whether some evidence
supports the judgment, the court of appeals considers only the evidence
most favorable to the judgment, disregarding all evidence opposed or
161. See 997 S.W.2d at 776. See also Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91
(Tex. 1999) (finding that the "availability of attorney's fees under a particular statute is a
question of law for the court," which is properly preserved through a motion for j.n.o.v.
"A jury can determine the amount of attorney's fees whether or not they can be recovered
under the theory of law submitted to the jury.").
162. Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Lubbock County Hosp. Dist., 987 S.W.2d 50,
52 (Tex. 1998).
163. See Holland, 1 S.W.3d at 91.
164. In re Epic Holdings, 985 S.W.2d 41, 54 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
165. Frazier v. Yu, 987 S.W.2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
166. Id.
167. 981 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1998, n. pet. h.).
168. Id. at 813.
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contrary to it. If any legal theory is supported by the evidence, the court
of appeals must affirm the trial court's judgment. 69
Findings of fact contained in a judgment do not change the analysis,
particularly where no findings or conclusions were ever requested by the
appellant. Rule 299a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure clearly pro-
vides that "findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be recited in a
judgment."' 70 If they are, "they cannot form the basis of a claim on ap-
peal." 7' Accordingly, an appellant cannot attempt to circumvent rule
299a by arguing that findings of fact in the trial court's judgment can be
used to support his claim on appeal. 72
2. Timely Complaints on Appeal
Although rule 33.1 refers only to preservation of error in the trial
court, the Texas Supreme Court cited rule 33.1 in holding that the court
of appeals lacked authority to reverse and remand a judgment based on a
claim disposed of by the trial court on summary judgment and not com-
plained of on appeal. 73 Specifically, the court concluded that a party
who does not "complain in the court of appeals about the trial court's
adverse judgment disposing of his claim" fails to preserve error.174
Moreover, under rule 33.1, the argument raised on appeal must reflect
the objection raised in the trial court. Thus, a party seeking a remittitur
in the trial court based on principles of comparative negligence may not
urge remittitur on appeal based on the plaintiff's failure to prove his
damages. 75
Finally, under broad form submission of jury issues, a party should
challenge every element supporting the finding or risk waiver. According
to the Beaumont court of appeals, "[w]hen a damage issue is submitted in
broad form, it is difficult to ascertain the amount the jury awarded for
169. See id. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Reliance Ins. Co. v. Denton Cent.
Appraisal Dist., 999 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1999, no pet. h.) similarly held
that "[u]nchallenged findings of fact are binding unless the contrary is established as a
matter of law or there is no evidence to support the findings." Id. at 629. If there is any
evidence to support them, the Reliance court concluded, they "will be sustained." Id.
170. TEx. R. Civ. P. 299a (emphasis added). Frommer, 981 S.W.2d at 814.
171. Frommer, 981 S.W.2d at 814 (citing R.S. v. B.J.J., 883 S.W.2d 711, 715 n.5 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1994, no writ); Sutherland v. Cobern, 843 S.W.2d 127, 131 n.7 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied)).
172. See Frommer, 981 S.W.2d at 814. The first court of appeals in Frommer refused to
adopt or reject the Amarillo Court of Appeals' decision in Hill v. Hill, 971 S.W.2d 153
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.). In Hill, the Amarillo court concluded that, if there is
no conflict between separate findings of fact and conclusions of law and findings contained
in a judgment, then those contained in the judgment should still be given effect. See Hill,
971 S.W.2d at 155-56. The Frommer court noted that this conclusion in Hill presumes
findings of fact were actually requested and received. See Fronmer, 981 S.W.2d at 814.
Without approving or disapproving of the Hill "no conflict analysis," the Frommer court
rejected the appellant's argument that, because no findings of fact were requested, there
was no conflict with those in the judgment. See id.
173. See Brewerton v. Dalrymple, 997 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. 1999).
174. Id.
175. See Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 997 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1999, pet. filed).
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each element of damages. '' 176 As a result, the court concluded, "to suc-
cessfully challenge a multi-element damage award on appeal, an appel-
lant must address all of the elements [of damages] and show the evidence
is insufficient to support the entire damage award. '177 Because the ap-
pellant attacked only the mental anguish portion of the damage award,
the court held that the appellant had waived its sufficiency challenge to
the damage award. 178
3. Charge Error
As part of an instruction on a lost profits measure of damages based on
breach of contract, it is reversible error to fail to instruct the jury that it
should not consider any costs or loss that the plaintiff avoided by not
having to perform. 179 Similarly, it is harmful error to fail to instruct the
jury on causation, especially where the jury sent out a note reflecting its
confusion over which standard to apply and was deadlocked "before be-
ing given an Allen charge. '180
Moreover, where the controlling issues for multiple claims (such as
strict liability and breach of warranty claims in a crashworthiness case)
are "functionally identical," the trial court is not required to submit sepa-
rate questions on the claims.181
IV. JUDGMENTS
A. FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
In this season's installment of the continuing saga of "what constitutes
a final judgment," the Houston court of appeals held that when a trial
court enters a severance order with the stated intention of making a par-
tial summary judgment final and appealable, "the Mother Hubbard
clause in [such a] severance order [creates] a final and appealable judg-
ment only as to the parties and claims in the severed cause."'182 In Adam,
the appellants argued that a Mother Hubbard clause in a severance order
severing a partial summary judgment that disposed of two parties re-
sulted in a final judgment of the original cause. In response to this argu-
ment, the court first restated the general principles governing finality in
the summary judgment context. If the order granting summary judgment
contains a Mother Hubbard clause, the judgment is final and appeala-
ble.183 As a result, when a partial summary judgment is entered, "the
176. Id. at 921-22.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See Lafarge Corp. v. Wolff, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 181,188 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet.
denied).
180. Toennies v. Quantum Chem. Corp., 998 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, pet. filed).
181. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1999).
182. Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 988 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (emphasis added).
183. See id. at 426 (citing Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. 1993)).
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judgment becomes final and appealable if one of the following occurs: (1)
the order granting summary judgment includes a Mother Hubbard clause;
or (2) the trial court signs an order severing the parties and claims ad-
dressed by the summary judgment motion into a separate case."'184 The
court went on to explain that when a partial summary judgment order
erroneously disposes of a party who was not addressed by the motion for
summary judgment, that party has two alternatives: (1) while it has ple-
nary jurisdiction, ask the trial court to correct the judgment, or (2) perfect
a timely appeal from the erroneous judgment. Failure to do either of
these alternatives results in the erroneous summary judgment becoming
final and unappealable as to that party. 185
Unlike when a partial summary judgment order includes a Mother
Hubbard clause, when the order severing the partial summary judgment
from the main case includes such a clause, it does not operate to create a
final judgment as to all parties in both the original case and the severed
case. It operates only to create a final and appealable judgment as to the
parties and claim in the severed cause. 186
Reflecting what is probably a pervasive feeling of frustration among
practitioners and courts, Justice Taft filed a concurring opinion in Adam,
suggesting "lock[ing] Mother Hubbard in the cupboard and return[ing] to
the rule ... that a judgment is final and appealable only if it expressly
disposes of all parties and all claims in the case."' 187 In Justice Taft's
words, "[w]hat began as a benign growth allowing review of unripe claims
on appeal, in Mafrige, 88 became a malignant cancer cutting off causes of
action before trial, in Inglish."'189
Further disenchantment with the supreme court's decisions in Mafrige
and Inglish is seen in the Houston court of appeals' opinion in Lehmann
v. Har-Con Corp.190 In that case, only one of two defendants moved for
summary judgment. The summary judgment order granting the defen-
dant summary judgment, however, contained a Mother Hubbard clause.
Under Inglish, the judgment was final and appealable even though it
granted more relief than requested.1 91
Embarking on a serious critique of Mafrige and Inglish, the Lehmann
court asserted that the case before it "demonstrates the unfairness" of the
184. Adam, 988 S.W.2d at 426.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 427. As learned the hard way by the appellants in Diversified Financial
Systems, Inc. v. Hill, Heard, O'Neal, Gilstrap & Goetz, P.C., 3 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1999, no. pet. h.), "a partial summary judgment becomes final and ap-
pealable upon the severing of the parties and claims disposed of by the partial summaryjudgment into a separate cause; the trial court is not required to enter another judgment to
make the severed cause final and appealable." Id.
187. Adam, 988 S.W.2d at 427 (Taft, J., concurring).
188. Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. 1993).
189. Adam, 988 S.W.2d at 427-48 (Taft, J., concurring) (citing Inglish v. Union State
Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. 1997)).
190. 988 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
191. See id. at 417 (citing Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811).
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finality rule of Inglish and Mafrige.192 The court pointed out in Lehmann
that the second defendant who did not move for summary judgment
would not have been entitled to it under the summary judgment rule.
"Yet, under the 'bright line rule' established in Mafrige and Inglish, the
second defendant was able to get a judgment 1) that it did not ask for and
2) to which the Lehmann's did not have an opportunity to respond." 193
The Lehmann court said this was not only "unfair," but also in apparent
contradiction of the high standard set out in rule 166a(b) for obtaining
summary judgment. 194 It "exalts form over substance" and mandates fi-
nal judgment "when neither the parties nor the trial judge contemplated
one."195
The Lehmann court further urged that "Mafrige is not as clear to liti-
gants as the supreme court believes it is."'196 For example, what if a sum-
mary judgment entitled "Interlocutory Judgment" states in the judgment
itself that only one of the defendants has moved for judgment and the
judgment contains a Mother Hubbard clause? Under Mafrige, the judg-
ment would "very arguably" be final. 197 In short, the court explained,
"Mafrige has created several problems: 1) it is catching the parties by
surprise-we have had more than a few appeals dismissed on the basis of
Mafrige; 2) it exalts form over substance; and 3) in more than a few situa-
tions, it ignores common sense." 198
Frustrated with the situation, the Lehmann court went so far as to rec-
ommend that "parties to a summary judgment proceeding should never
use a Mother Hubbard Clause" because, by using one, "they may inad-
vertently dismiss parties and/or causes of action never addressed or in-
tended to be addressed in the motion."1 99 Dismissing the appeal for lack
of jurisdiction, the court urged the Texas Supreme Court "to reconsider
the harshness of its bright line rule imposed by Mafrige and its
progeny. 20 0
Faced with a similar situation in Midkiff v. Hancock East Texas Sanita-
tion, Inc.20 1-an appeal involving a partial summary judgment errone-
ously made final through the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause-the
resourceful Beaumont Court of Appeals devised a unique solution to the
problem. First, the Beaumont court refused to read Mafrige as holding
that the mere inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause automatically ren-
192. Lehmann, 988 S.W.2d at 417.
193. Id.
194. See id.; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(b).
195. Lehmann, 988 S.W.2d at 417.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 418.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.; see also In re Cobos, 994 S.W.2d 313, 315 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no
pet.) where the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal for want of jurisdic-
tion because of the finality of a partial summary judgment due to the presence of a Mother
Hubbard clause, calling the rule of Mafrige and Inglish "harsh."
201. 996 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet.).
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ders all orders final for appellate purposes. "The summary judgment or-
der," the court explained, "must be taken as a whole and what it purports
to do is critical to the inquiry. °20 2 If the intent of the order, as manifested
in its language, does not embrace all claims and all parties, and a "claim
logically cannot be brought within the grasp of the Mother Hubbard
clause, the order is interlocutory. ''213 Because the summary judgment or-
der in Midkiff spoke specifically to one defendant and there was no men-
tion of the other defendant's motion for summary judgment, the order,
taken as a whole, logically implicated the merits of the plaintiff's claims
only as applicable to the defendant expressly mentioned in the order.
Given this determination, the Beaumont court noted that it could dis-
miss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, or find the summary judgment
final as to all parties pursuant to the Mother Hubbard clause. Instead of
doing either, the court essentially side-stepped Mafrige and invoked rule
44.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, which "provides that a
court of appeals must not affirm or reverse a judgment or dismiss an ap-
peal for formal defects or irregularities in appellate procedure without
allowing a reasonable time to correct or amend the defects or irregulari-
ties."' 20 4 The court accordingly abated the appeal and remanded the
cause to the trial court with directions to either sever the claims disposed
of in the summary judgment order from those apparently still pending as
to the second defendant, or enter an order or judgment disposing of all of
the plaintiff's claims against the second defendant.20 5 In a footnote, the
Beaumont court noted the considerable comments that Mafrige has
engendered. 20 6
The San Antonio Court of Appeals in Rodriguez v. NBC Bank20 7 like-
wise found a creative way to avoid the harshness of Mafrige and Inglish.
In NBC Bank, the court determined that the Mother Hubbard clause in
the summary judgment, stating that "'[a]ll relief not expressly granted
herein is denied,"' was ambiguous because it was unclear what "herein"
referred to.20 8 One interpretation of "'herein,"' the court explained,
would include the latest plaintiff's petition, resulting in the disposition of
all causes of action against all parties. But the court concluded a more
logical interpretation, and one that made "infinitely more sense," was
that "herein" referred to the motion being relied on and thus applied to
the movant, not the respondent.20 9 "'Herein,"' the court held, "refers to
the motion and the interpretation is to be made by referencing the four
202. Id. at 416.
203. Id.
204. Id.; TEX. R. Air,. P. 44.3.
205. See Midkiff, 996 S.W.2d at 416.
206. See id. at 415 n.1 (quoting Clinard J. "Buddy" Hanby, Texas Civil Appellate Up-
date, XII THE APPELLATE ADVOCATE 3 (Tex. St. B. Appellate Sec. Rep.), June 1999, at 32-
33).
207. 5 S.W.3d 756 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
208. Id. at 763.
209. Id.
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corners of the document. ' 210 Accordingly, where the movant asked for
and was granted a summary judgment and a certain amount of fees, this
was the entirety of the movant's relief "expressly granted.1211 Any other
relief to the movant that had not been expressly granted was denied. The
words "'[a]ll relief not expressly granted herein is denied"' thus applied
only to the movant's requests for relief.21 2 Like the other Texas appellate
courts discussed above, the San Antonio court also noted the "pitfalls" of
the Mafrige rule.2 13
The Dallas Court of Appeals in Lowe v. Teator214 refused to character-
ize the rule of Mafrige as a "bright line" test and criticized the Houston
court's opinion in Lehmann for doing so. The Lowe court asserted that,
under Mafrige, the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause does not auto-
matically render a judgment final. Rather, the language must be read
"from the context of the document in which it appears. '21 5 Accordingly,
"[i]f the language in the order preceding the Mother Hubbard clause is
broad and inclusive enough to encompass all issues and parties before the
court, then the clause may be read to dispose of all claims in the case not
otherwise specifically addressed in the order. '2 16 However, if "the lan-
guage preceding the Mother Hubbard clause is limited in its scope, such
that it evidences the intent of the trial court not to dispose of all the
claims in the case before it, a Mother Hubbard clause will not convert the
otherwise interlocutory summary judgment order into a final judg-
ment. '21 7 In other words, a partial summary judgment is not a final and
appealable order solely because of the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard
clause irrespective of any other language in the judgment evidencing an
intent that the judgment not be final. "Such a rule," the Lowe court held,
"would offend fundamental concepts of justice" and would be a result
never intended by Mafrige.2 18
B. JUDGMENTS NUNC PRO TUNC
"After the trial court loses its plenary jurisdiction over a judgment, it
can correct only clerical errors by judgment nunc pro tunc. ' 219 A clerical
error is any error not resulting from judicial reasoning or determina-




213. NCB Bank, 5 S.W.3d at 761 n.3. Dissenting, Justice Green argued that the major-
ity's attempt to distinguish NBC Bank to avoid the harshness of the Mafrige rule "cannot
honestly be done." Id. at 768 (Green, J., dissenting).
214. 1 S.W.3d 819 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. filed).




219. In re Rollins Leasing Inc., 987 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, orig. proceeding).
220. See id. at 636.
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opposed to the entering of a judgment. 2 21
To determine whether a correction is a judicial or clerical error, the
court of appeals looks not to the judgment that should have been ren-
dered, but to the judgment actually rendered, which is a question of
fact.222 In other words, to demonstrate a clerical error, a relator or appel-
lant must be able to point to evidence reflecting that the trial judge actu-
ally rendered a judgment different from the judgment entered. Thus, for
example, a judgment entered erroneously dismissing all defendants in-
stead of just one is a judicial error where the relators are unable to direct
the court of appeals to any evidence (like discussions among the parties
and judge at a hearing) reflecting that the dismissal was to apply to only
one defendant.
V. EXTENDING THE APPELLATE TIMETABLE
A. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
A motion for rehearing filed within the time period for filing a motion
for new trial may extend the appellate timetable if it "seek[s] to set aside
an existing judgment and request[s] relitigation of the issues. ' 223 Accord-
ingly, where a motion for rehearing requests the trial court to "'grant a
rehearing"' and "'deny defendants' motion for summary judgment,"' the
motion seeks to set aside the existing judgment for the purpose of litigat-
ing the issues.224 Such a motion may be considered a request for a new
trial because, if granted, a trial would have resulted.
During the Survey period, the Houston court of appeals in Finley v.
J.C. Pace Ltd. faced the issue of whether the appellate timetable is ex-
tended if the filing fee for a motion for new trial is paid after the trial
court loses plenary jurisdiction.2 25 The court held that a timely tendered
motion for new trial extends the appellate timetable regardless of when
the filing fee is paid.226 In reaching this conclusion, the court concurred
with the reasoning of the Waco, Corpus Christi, and San Antonio Courts
of Appeals that, while an untimely payment may deprive the trial court of
the ability to rule on the motion for new trial, "the appellate timetable
would nevertheless be extended, given the supreme court's policy of lib-
erally interpreting rules in favor of permitting appeal." 22 7
221. Id.
222. See id.
223. Finley v. J.C. Pace Ltd., 4 S.W.3d 319, 320 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no
pet. h.).
224. Id.
225. In 1996, the Texas Supreme Court in Tate v. E.I DuPont de Nemours & Co. ex-
tended the appellate timetable when the appellant paid the filing fee for the motion for
new trial after the motion was overruled, but before the trial court lost plenary jurisdiction.
See Tate v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 934 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. 1996). The supreme court,
however, expressly refused to decide whether the appellate timetable is extended if the
filing fee is paid after the trial court loses plenary jurisdiction.
226. See Finley, 4 S.W.3d, at 321.
227. Id. (citing Polley v. Odom, 937 S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ);
Ramirez v. Get "N" Go # 103, 888 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ
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B. REQUESTS FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
"A request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extends the ap-
pellate timetable if findings and conclusions are either required by the
Rules of Civil Procedure or, if not required, could properly be considered
by the appellate court. z22 8 Because findings of fact and conclusions of
law have no place in a summary judgment hearing, a request for such
findings and conclusions will not extend the timetable for perfecting ap-
peal from a summary judgment.229 However, if part of the judgment is
based upon an evidentiary hearing in which the trial court heard testi-
mony, a request for findings and conclusions will extend the appellate
timetable.230
What about a request for findings and conclusions following a trial on
agreed facts? Does such a request extend the appellate timetable? Ac-
cording to the Beaumont Court of Appeals in Port Arthur, it does not. In
reaching this conclusion, the Port Arthur court noted that the only issue
on appeal after a trial on agreed facts is whether the trial court correctly
applied the law. "The issue decided by the trial court," the court of ap-
peals reasoned, "is as much a matter of law as any summary
judgment. 231
VI. SUPERSEDING THE JUDGMENT
When a district clerk is sued in his or her official capacity, the clerk's
notice of appeal operates as a supersedeas bond, thereby superseding the
trial court's judgment until all appellate rights are exhausted.232 In a case
involving the imposition of fines against a clerk for violating an injunc-
tion, the supreme court held that the clerk could not be held in contempt
for violating an injunction "until all appeals relating to the judgment were
exhausted" and a mandate enforcing the injunction issued.233 The fact
that the clerk did not seek appellate review in the supreme court and the
fact that the opposing party's appeal to the supreme court was unrelated
to the injunction did not compel a finding that the clerk was in contempt
starting from the date the clerk's motion for rehearing was overruled in
the court of appeals.
Ordinarily, a judgment debtor is entitled to supersede a judgment
denied); Spellman v. Hoang, 887 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ)).
Despite being given time to pay the filing fee, the appellant in Finley failed to do so and
the court ultimately dismissed the appeal. See Finley v. J.C. Pace Ltd., No. 01-99-00662-
CV, 1999 WL 997788, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 4, 1999, no pet.) (per
curiam) (not designated for publication).
228. Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Port Arthur Teachers Ass'n, 990 S.W.2d 955, 956
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. filed).
229. See id. at 957.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 958.
232. See TEX. CIv, PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2000); In re
Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1999).
233. Long, 984 S.W.2d at 626 (emphasis added).
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pending appeal, thereby suspending its enforcement. 234 But when the
judgment creditor is a governmental entity that has no pecuniary interest
in the case, rule 24.2(a)(5) instructs that the trial court must determine
whether to suspend enforcement by weighing the harm that is likely to
result if the enforcement is not suspended with the harm that is likely to
result to others if enforcement is suspended.235 In In re South Texas Col-
lege of Law, the Texas Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of man-
damus in which the South Texas College of Law and Texas A & M
University sought suspension of the trial court's judgment that perma-
nently enjoined them from continuing to operate under an Affiliation
Agreement. 236 Justice Hecht, dissenting, would have granted the manda-
mus petition because in his view, "no evidence was adduced to the district
court that any harm from continued operations under the Affiliation
Agreement pending appeal would ever outweigh the economic and
noneconomic injuries to South Texas and Texas A & M from enforcement
of the district court's judgment. '2 37
VII. PLENARY POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
During the Annual Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued its
opinion in In re Dickason,238 detailing the well-established timeframe for
expiration of the trial court's plenary jurisdiction. In that case, the appel-
lant filed a timely motion for new trial on December 19, 1996, and an
amended motion for new trial on December 26, 1996. On December 27,
1996, the trial judge, who was leaving the bench at the end of the year,
overruled appellant's motion for new trial by written order. Despite this
order, on February 10, 1997, an assigned judge signed an order granting
appellant's amended motion for new trial. Holding that the trial court
did not have plenary power to grant the new trial on February 10, 1997,
the Texas Supreme Court explained that "[w]hen a party files a motion
for new trial within thirty days of a judgment, the trial court has plenary
power for seventy-five days following the date the court signed the judg-
ment to act on that motion. '2 39 Once the trial court overrules a timely-
filed motion for new trial-even if well within the seventy-five day time
period-the court retains plenary power for only another thirty days.2 40
Filing an amended motion for new trial, the court noted, does not extend
the trial court's plenary power.241 Because the trial court overruled the
234. See TEX. R. App. P. 24.1.
235. See TEX. R. App. P. 24.2(a)(5).
236. See 4 S.W.3d 219, 219 (Tex. 1999). After the Texas Higher Education Coordinating
Board had questioned the validity of the Affiliation Agreement, South Texas sued the
Board for a judicial declaration of the issue, and Texas A & M intervened.
237. Id. at 222 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
238. 987 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
239. Id. at 571; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(c).
240. id.; see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(e).
241. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b. The court quoted the historical note to rule 329b, which
states that "[an amended motion for new trial gains no additional time." Dickason, 987
S.W.2d at 571 n.4.
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appellant's motion for new trial on December 27, 1996, the court retained
plenary power for only the next thirty days, until January 26, 1997. Ac-
cordingly, the February 10, 1997 ruling purporting to grant a new trial was
issued by the new trial judge when the trial court no longer had jurisdic-
tion over the case, rendering the February order void. 242
In another case challenging the trial court's plenary jurisdiction to
grant a new trial, the supreme court construed Texas Civil Procedure rule
329b(c) liberally. The court held in In re Barber243 that a document bear-
ing the trial judge's rubber-stamped signature constitutes a "written order
signed" under rule 329b(c) if the judge directed another person who is
under the judge's immediate authority to affix the judge's signature using
the rubber stamp.244 Significantly, the court expressly determined that
the person affixing the judge's facsimile signature need not be in the pres-
ence of the judge at the time the rubber stamp is affixed. The court rea-
soned that it may be unrealistic to require the judge's actual physical
presence at the time the signature is affixed in every case. Requiring that
the signature be affixed by someone under the judge's immediate author-
ity and at the judge's direction, the court concluded, "should provide suf-
ficient safeguards. '245 Since the rubber-stamped signature in Barber was
affixed to the order granting new trial during the trial court's plenary
jurisdiction, the order was timely and effective to grant a new trial.2 46
The San Antonio Court of Appeals considered issues relating to the
trial court's plenary jurisdiction in In re Montemayor247 in the context of
a dismissal for want of prosecution. When a case is dismissed for want of
prosecution, the court of appeals explained, "a party seeking reinstate-
ment must file a verified motion to reinstate within thirty days after the
date on which the order of dismissal was signed. 248 If no verified motion
to reinstate is filed, the trial court's plenary power expires thirty days
after the date on which the dismissal order was signed. 249 An exception
to the rule that procedural timetables run from the date the dismissal
order is signed exists, pursuant to rule 306a(4) of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, for a party who learns of the order more than twenty, but less
than ninety, days after it was signed. 250 However, to benefit from the
242. See Dickason, 987 S.W.2d at 571.
243. 982 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
244. See id. at 366-67.
245. Id. at 367.
246. The court noted that, for purposes of determining whether an order granting a new
trial is timely, "the date of signing (not the date of entry) controls." Id.; see also TEX. R.
Civ. P. 3296(c). Dissenting, Justice Baker disagreed with the majority's decision to
"write[ ]out" the requirement established in Stork v. State, 114 Tex. Crim. 398, 23 S.W.2d
733, 735 (1929), that a facsimile stamped signature must be made in the judge's presence.
See In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d at 369 (Baker, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Spector). Jus-
tice Baker also argued that the majority reconciled conflicting evidence concerning
whether the court coordinator had the trial judge's authority to place a stamped signature
on the order, which is improper in a mandamus proceeding.
247. 2 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding).
248. Id. at 545 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 165a(3)).
249. See Montemayor, 2 S.W.3d at 545.
250. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 306a(4); TEX. R. App. P. 4.2.
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exception found in rule 306a(4), "the party must prove in the trial court,
on sworn motion and notice, the date he or his attorney first received
notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing."'25'
VIII. STANDING TO APPEAL
Generally, only parties of record in the trial court are entitled to appeal
the trial court's judgment. However, as recognized by the Texas Supreme
Court in Motor Vehicle Board of the Texas Department of Transportation
v. El Paso Independent Automobile Dealers Ass'n,252 "an exception exists
when the appellant is deemed to be a party under the doctrine of virtual
representation. 2 53 In that case, the attorney general appealed a judg-
ment declaring certain Texas Blue Laws unconstitutional, despite the at-
torney general's nonparticipation in the case prior to entry of judgment.
Both the court of appeals and supreme court held that the attorney gen-
eral had the right to appeal under the doctrine of virtual representa-
tion.2 54  As explained by the supreme court, to claim virtual
representation, an appellant must show that: "(1) it is bound by the judg-
ment; (2) its privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record;
and (3) there is an identity of interest between the appellant and a party
to the judgment. '2 55 In Motor Vehicle, the appellant satisfied all of these
requirements and, accordingly, was permitted to appeal the judgment.2 56
The supreme court in Motor Vehicle also rejected the respondent's ar-
gument that the petitioner lacked standing to bring the petition for re-
view because the appeal was filed in the name of the "Motor Vehicle
Division" rather than the "Motor Vehicle Board.''2 57 Calling the discrep-
ancy "a case of misnomer that does not affect the Board's standing," the
supreme court noted its policy "to construe the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure liberally, so that decisions turn on substance rather than procedural
technicality. '258 Because no confusion resulted from the petition, the er-
ror did not affect the petitioner's standing to bring the petition for review.
251. Montemayor, 2 S.W.3d at 545. As the appellant in Montemayor learned, substan-
tial compliance with the dictates of rule 306a will not suffice. According to the San
Antonio court, rule 306a(4) is not self-implementing. "Unless the procedures of rule
306a(5) are followed, the trial court's plenary power is not restarted, and it is without
authority to act more than thirty days after the date the appealable order is signed." Id. at
546 (citing In re Jones, 974 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceed-
ing)). Moreover, an order reinstating a case, even if made within the timeframes articu-
lated in rule 306a, is ineffective if it is not written-an oral ruling, even in open court, is
ineffective to reinstate the case. A trial court's inherent authority is limited by the require-
ment of a timely written order of reinstatement.
252. 1 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
253. Id. at 110.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See id. The supreme court, however, disagreed with the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that the appellant had waived its right to appeal by sending a letter prior to judgment
allowing local officials to defend the statute at issue. The letter, the supreme court held,
was not "an express renunciation of a known right" establishing waiver. Id. at 111.
257. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
258. Motor Vehicle, 1 S.W.3d at Ill.
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IX. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
A. "REASONABLE EXPLANATION"
Consistent with the cases decided during the preceding Annual Survey
period,259 a motion for extension of time is implied when an appellant
files a notice of appeal beyond the deadline prescribed by Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26.1(a) but within the fifteen-day period allowed
under rule 26.3.260 Although the motion for extension may be implied,
the appellant is not relieved of the obligation to provide a reasonable
explanation for its failure to file a timely notice of appeal or other
perfecting document. 261
A "reasonable explanation" may be that the default was the result of
"inadvertence, mistake or mischance" (i.e., negligence), but it may not be
"deliberate or intentional. '2 62 Two decisions published during the Survey
period found the excuse to be deficient. In the first, Kidd v. Paxton,
26 3
the appellant was likely surprised to learn that his negligence-based ex-
cuses were unacceptable. The court held that the appellant's excuse that
he "'misunderst[ood] . . . the law"' by "'erroneously calculat[ing] the
perfection deadline by adding thirty days to the date the trial court over-
ruled the Motion for New Trial"' to be "implausible and, therefore, un-
reasonable. '264  Additionally, counsel's explanation that he was
preoccupied with other duties was deficient because he did not establish
how those other matters interfered with his duty to perfect this appeal.
The court explained that "[s]aying that one has a plethora of other work
alone is not sufficient. A causative nexus ... must be established through
fact. " 265
The second decision, Weik v. Second Baptist Church of Houston,266
found that the default was the product of a deliberate choice. The court
259. See Dimotsis v. Lloyds, 966 S.W.2d 657, 657 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no
pet.); Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997).
260. See Kidd v. Paxton, 1 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, rule 53.7(f) motion
filed); Coronado v. Farming Tech., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 901, 901 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999) (per curiam) dismissed by No. 01-99-00171-CV, 1999 WL 548703 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] July 29, 1999, no pet.) (per curiam); see also Weik v. Second Baptist
Church, 988 S.W.2d 437, 438-39 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (con-
cerning late-filed appeal bond); cf Bixby v. Bice, 992 S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tex. App.-Waco
1999, no pet.) (dismissing the appeal because the Notice of Appeal was not filed until
ninety-two days after appellants received notice of the signed judgment).
261. See Kidd, 1 S.W.3d at 310; Coronado, 994 S.W.2d at 902 (ordering that appellant
has fifteen days to file an explanation); Weik, 988 S.W.2d at 439.
262. Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. 1989) (interpreting former
rule 41(a)(2)).
263. 1 S.W.3d at 310-11.
264. Id. at 310.
265. Id. at 311. Justice Johnson, dissenting, argued that the standard by which the ma-
jority tests appellants' explanation for internal consistency, detailed factual support, and
evidence showing that the circumstances relied upon as an excuse caused the default was
too strict. Therefore, the dissent would have held that the supreme court requires only a
statement of circumstances indicating that appellant's failure to comply with the deadline
was not intentional or deliberate.
266. 988 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
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held that no good cause exists for extending the filing deadline when the
appellant intentionally delayed the filing of the appeal bond based on his
attorney's advice that "if he appealed the case while the trial court still
had the authority to reinstate the case,... the trial court would reinstate
the case and [appellant] would have a difficult time prosecuting his claim
because of the trial court's displeasure with [the appellant]. '267
B. DETERMINING THE DATE OF FILING
The Texas Supreme Court confirmed in Coastal Banc SSB v. Helle that
"[w]hen a dispute arises as to the filing date of an instrument essential to
a courts [sic] appellate jurisdiction, the date the instrument is tendered to
the clerk controls, and not the file-stamp date. '2 68 The evidence the
court deemed sufficient to establish that the appellant had filed the re-
quired materials2 69 included affidavits from appellant's counsel, an affida-
vit from the county clerk who had received the filing, and copies of
shipping receipts.270
C. RULE 306A
To establish a prima facie case for late notice of judgment necessary to
postpone the start date of appellate timetables under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 306a,271 appellant should file a verified motion, thereby invok-
ing the trial court's jurisdiction for the limited purpose of holding a hear-
ing to determine the date of notice.272 Although several courts of appeals
require that such a motion be filed within thirty days of receiving no-
tice,273 the Austin Court of Appeals allows parties to file the motion at
any time within the court's plenary power counted from the date of no-
267. Id. at 439.
268. 988 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Jamar v. Patterson, 868
S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993)).
269. At issue was the timeliness of the filing of appellant's certificate of cash deposit in
lieu of bond within the six-month deadline under the former writ of error procedure. See
TEX. R. Api,. P. 45(e) (repealed). Bond is not a specific requirement under the restricted
appeal, which replaced the writ of error. See TEX. R. Aii,. P. 30.
270. See Coastal Banc, 988 S.W.2d at 215-16.
271. Rule 306a(4) provides:
If within twenty days after the judgment or other appealable order is signed,
a party adversely affected by it or his attorney has neither received the notice
required by paragraph (3) of this rule nor acquired actual knowledge of the
order, then with respect to that party all the periods mentioned in paragraph
(1) shall begin on the date that such party or his attorney received such no-
tice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing, whichever occurred first,
but in no event shall such periods begin more than ninety days after the origi-
nal judgment or other appealable order was signed.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
272. See Grondona v. Sutton, 991 S.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. de-
nied). However, the rules do not require appellant to move for a determination of late
notice.
273. See Gonzalez v. Sanchez, 927 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ);
Montalvo v. Rio Nat'l Bank, 885 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no
writ); Womack-Humphreys Architects, Inc. v. Barrasso, 886 S.W.2d 809, 816 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1994, writ denied).
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tice.274 However, regardless of which deadline applies, the motion can-
not be amended beyond the deadline to add facts necessary to establish a
prima facie case on the notice issue, and a failure to obtain a ruling during
that period is fatal to the appellant's attempt to extend the timetable for
appeal. 275
D. AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS
An affidavit of inability to pay costs on appeal must be filed in the trial
court with or before the notice of appeal. 276 A court of appeals may ex-
tend the time to file the affidavit if, within fifteen days after the date the
notice of appeal is filed, the party files a motion to extend time.2 7 7 An
affidavit of indigence or motion to proceed in forma pauperis filed after
the notice of appeal and after the expiration of the deadline to file an
extension is ineffective; consequently, appellant's failure to pay for the
record and for appellate filing fees results in dismissal under rule 37.3(b)
of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 278
In In re Sosa,279 the appellant timely filed her affidavit of indigence,
but the trial court sustained a contest challenging the affidavit. The ap-
pellant successfully sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial judge
to withdraw the order sustaining the contest. Following the supreme
court's decision in Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Honorable Thirteenth Court
of Appeals,280 the San Antonio court held that "the fact that [the appel-
lant] was contractually responsible for court costs does not preclude her
from appealing" a judgment and that the trial court should not have
based its decision in part on its perception that the appellant's attorney
had abused the indigency provisions in past cases involving other cli-
ents. 281 Holding that "[m]andamus is the appropriate remedy when a
contest to an affidavit of indigence is improperly sustained," the court of
appeals conditionally granted the writ.282
274. See Grondona, 991 S.W.2d at 92; Vineyard Bay Dev. Co. v. Vineyard on Lake
Travis, 864 S.W.2d 170, 172, n.1 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ denied).
275. See Grondona, 991 S.W.2d at 92; Montalvo, 885 S.W.2d at 237-38; Barrasso, 886
S.W.2d at 816; Owen v. Hodge, 874 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
no writ); Conaway v. Lopez, 843 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
276. See TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(c)(1).
277. See TEX. R. App. P. 20.1(c)(3); Holt v. F.F. Enters., 990 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1998, pet. denied).
278. See Mikkilineni v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.3d 298, 299 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.) (warning that appellant's appeal will be subject to dismissal if 45
days pass and payment for the record has not been made and appellant has not made
arrangements for payment); Negrini v. Smith, Nelson & Clement P.C., 998 S.W.2d 362, 363
(Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (dismissing the appeal for failure to pay
filing fees).
279. 980 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).
280. 934 S.W.2d 349, 353-54 (Tex. 1996).
281. See Sosa, 980 S.W.2d at 816. Justice Hardberger concurred, arguing that, although
Griffin controlled the outcome of this case, it is not good public policy to order the public
to pay the costs of appeal when an appellant has a contingency fee arrangement with an
attorney who refuses to pay the costs of the appeal.
282. Id. at 817.
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Two weeks after the Sosa case was decided, however, the Texas Su-
preme Court issued its per curiam opinion in In re Arroyo, in which the
court held that under the amended rules, appeal is an adequate remedy
from an order sustaining a contest to an affidavit of indigence.283 Under
rule 25.1(a), a party may perfect an appeal merely by filing a notice of
appeal.284 Providing security for costs is no longer a prerequisite for in-
voking an appellate court's jurisdiction. Therefore, an indigent party "is
no longer precluded from perfecting appeal and challenging the trial
court's order sustaining a contest to the party's affidavit of indigence. '285
To ensure the adequacy of this avenue of appeal, "[t]he court of appeals
can and should, on motion or its own initiative, require the clerk and
court reporter under Rules 34.5(c)(1) and 34.6(d), respectively, to pre-
pare and file the portions of the record necessary to review an order sus-
taining a contest to an affidavit of indigence. '286
E. WHO MUST FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL?
If an appellee is satisfied with the relief granted by the trial court, but
wants to raise alternate grounds for the denial of any recovery by the
appellant, must the appellee perfect its own appeal? The Houston First
District Court of Appeals answered this question in the negative in Dean
v. Lafayette Place (Section One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc.287 The court
explained that, under the new rules of appellate procedure, "if an appel-
lee is satisfied with the relief granted by the trial court, but merely wants
to present additional, independent grounds for affirming the trial court's
judgment," he need not file a notice of appeal, but may raise the indepen-
dent grounds for affirmance in a cross-point. 288
X. THE RECORD ON APPEAL
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(f), when a significant
portion of the recording of the trial proceedings is inaudible, a party is
entitled to a new trial if: (1) the appellant timely requests a reporter's
record; (2) the inaudible recording occurred without the appellant's fault;
(3) the inaudible portion is necessary to the appeal's resolution; and (4)
the parties cannot agree on a complete reporter's record.289 With regard
to the second requirement, the new appellate rules now place the duty on
the court recorder to "ensure that the recording system functions prop-
erly throughout the proceeding and that a complete, clear, and transcrib-
able recording is made. '290 Thus, appellant's failure to make sure that
283. See 988 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex. 1998).
284. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 25.1(a).
285. Arroyo, 988 S.W.2d at 738.
286. Id. at 739.
287. 999 S.W.2d 814 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
288. Id. at 818.
289. See TEX. R. App. P. 34.6(f); In re G.M.S., 991 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1999, pet. filed).
290. TEX. R. App. P. 13.2(a).
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the tape is functioning properly will not negate his right to a new trial.291
Although an appellant is entitled to a complete statement of facts, ap-
pellant's failure to object to the court reporter's absence during a wit-
ness's testimony will negate the appellant's right to a new trial. In Garza
v. Guerrero,292 appellants argued that because counsel met with the judge
during part of the proceedings in which the jury heard oral videotape
deposition testimony, they should be excused from the requirement to
object to the court reporter's failure to make a record of the testimony
heard by the jury. The court rejected that argument and found waiver,
concluding that there was nothing in the record showing that counsel was
never present in the courtroom while the videotape was played.2 93
A court reporter's failure to file a complete reporter's record by a date
specified by court order can result in criminal contempt charges, a fine,
disgorgement of the fee collected as payment for the reporter's record,
and costs. 294
XI. THE BRIEF ON APPEAL
The Rules of Appellate Procedure allow briefs to be supplemented or
amended upon whatever reasonable terms the court may prescribe when
justice requires. 295 When a party expressly limits his original brief to two
claims and one of those claims is weakened by a supreme court decision
handed down two months after oral argument, an appellate court does
not abuse its discretion when it refuses to consider a new claim asserted
in a supplemental brief.296 A party "cannot wait more than six months
and then argue that 'justice' requires that he be permitted post-argument
to resurrect an abandoned claim. '297
Additionally, when an appellant's amended brief contains no facts of
the case, no argument section, and no citation to the record, a court of
appeals may proceed as if appellant failed to file a brief. And if appellee
did file a responsive brief, the appellate court may affirm the judgment of
the trial court.298
XII. MOOT APPEALS
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones,299 the Texas Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principles governing appellate review of moot ap-
291. See G.M.S., 991 S.W.2d at 925. But cf. Richardson v. Richardson, 969 S.W.2d 534,
536-37 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.) (applying former Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 50(e)).
292. 993 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
293. See id. at 141.
294. See In re Ryan, 993 S.W.2d 294, 295-96 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
295. See TEX. R. App. P. 38; former TEX. R. App. P. 74(o) (superseded Sept. 1, 1997).
296. See Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998).
297. Id. at 65.
298. See TEX. R. App. P. 39.9(a), 38.8(a); Harkins v. Dever Nursing Home, 999 S.W.2d
571, 572-73 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
299. 1 S.W.3d 83 (Tex. 1999).
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peals. Appellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies,
the court held, because the separation of powers doctrine in the Texas
and United States Constitutions prohibits courts from rendering advisory
opinions. 300 A case becomes moot "if at any stage there ceases to be an
actual controversy between the parties." 30 1 In the temporary injunction
context, which was the issue before the court in National Collegiate, an
appeal becomes moot when the injunction becomes inoperative due to a
change in the status of the parties or the passage of time. Considering the
validity of such an injunction, the court explained, would constitute an
"impermissible advisory opinion. '30 2
A dismissal of an appeal for mootness "is not a ruling on the merits,"
while a dismissal with prejudice "functions as a final determination on the
merits. ' 30 3 It follows that in dismissing a cause as moot, an appellate
court cannot dismiss the appeal with prejudice.
XIII. SPECIAL APPEALS
A. APPEALS FROM JUSTICE COURT
Jurisdiction over an appeal of a justice court judgment lies in the court
or district court, not in the court of appeals. 30 4 As the appellant in Tejas
Elevator Co. v. Concord Elevator, Inc. 30 5 discovered, rule 2 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure does not provide an alternate avenue of
appeal to the court of appeals.306 Recognizing an appellate court's au-
thority under rule 2 to suspend a rule's operation in a particular case to
expedite a decision or for other good cause, the Dallas Court of Appeals
nonetheless held that nothing in rule 2 authorizes a court of appeals to
exercise jurisdiction over an appeal if none exists.307
On appeal to county court from a justice court judgment, the cause is
tried de novo. 30 8 Regardless, the plaintiff on appeal may not assert any
300. See id. at 86. See also TEX. CONS't. Art. 11, § 1.
301. 1 S.W.3d at 86.
302. Id. The court rather liberally construed the facts of National Collegiate to con-
clude that a student athlete's appeal from a temporary injunction enjoining the NCAA
from enforcing its player eligibility requirements to play football was not moot despite the
student's graduation from college, where there was evidence that he would be personally
adversely affected by possible retroactive penalties against the university. Under such cir-
cumstances, "a tangible and substantial controversy" existed between the parties with re-
spect to the portion of the injunction enjoining the NCAA from enforcing its restitution
rights. Id. at 88.
303. Ritchey v. Vasquez, 986 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Mossler
v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam) and Speer v. Presbyterian Chil-
dren's Home and Serv. Agency, 847 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1993)).
304. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CoDE ANN. §§ 51.001, 51.002 (Vernon 1997); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 574b.
305. 982 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1998, no pet.).
306. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 provides that "On a party's motion or on its
own initiative an appellate court may-to expedite a decision or for other good
cause-suspend a rule's operation in a particular case and order a different procedure; ... 
TEX. R. App. P. 2.
307. Tejas Elevator Co., 982 S.W.2d at 579.
308. TEX. R. Civ. P. 574b.
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new ground of recovery and the defendant may not set up any set-off or
counterclaim which was not pleaded in the court below.309 The proper
disposition of a counterclaim improperly pleaded in an appeal to county
court is not, however, dismissal, but rather severance. 310 If the improp-
erly raised counterclaim was a compulsory counterclaim that should have
been raised in the justice court proceeding, it may be barred under the
doctrine of res judicata in the severed suit.
"When an appeal from a justice court judgment is perfected in a county
court, the judgment of the justice court is annulled," and the case is tried
de novo in the county court.311 Because the judgment of the justice court
is nullified, the burden is on the appellee to obtain a new judgment. Ac-
cordingly, if the appellant fails to take any steps in the county court after
the case has been appealed, the appellee should not move to dismiss the
case for want of prosecution, as any dismissal by the county court will
effect a dismissal of the entire cause of action, leaving the matter standing
as if no suit had been filed. The dismissal will not effect a reinstatement
of the justice court's judgment against the appellant.
B. BILLS OF REVIEW
Several cases during this Annual Survey period reflect the inevitable
truth that courts do not look on bills of review with favor.312 It is well
settled that a plaintiff seeking to invoke a bill of review to set aside a final
judgment must establish three elements: (1) a meritorious defense; (2) an
excuse justifying the failure to make that defense which is based on the
fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposing party; and (3) an excuse
unmixed with the fault or negligence of the plaintiff.31 3 The distinguish-
ing characteristic among each of the bill of review cases reviewed during
this Survey period is that, in each, the bill of review plaintiffs did not have
a good excuse for failing to exhaust adequate legal remedies, and, accord-
ingly, the third element proved fatal to the parties' attempts to set aside a
prior judgment after the time for appeal had expired. 314 For example, in
Williamson and Ortmann, the failure to file a motion for new trial or reg-
ular appeal was fatal to the bill of review. In Dispensa, the court found
that the bill of review plaintiff knew of the judgment at least "within
thirty to thirty-five days" after its entry and, therefore, "had notice at a
309. TEX. R. Civ. P. 574a.
310. D'Tel Communications v. Roadway Package Svc., Inc., 987 S.W.2d 213, 214 (Tex.
App.-Eastland 1999, no pet.).
311. In re Garza, 990 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig.
proceeding).
312. See Williamson v. Williamson, 986 S.W.2d 379, 380 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no
pet.).
313. See Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 141 (Tex. 1989); Baker v. Goldsmith, 582
S.W.2d 404, 406-07 (Tex. 1979).
314. See Power v. Chapman, 994 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.);
Dispensa v. Univ. State Bank, 987 S.W.2d 923, 926-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, no pet.); Ortmann v. Ortmann, 999 S.W.2d 85, 91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, pet. denied); Williamson, 986 S.W.2d at 381.
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time when he could have had the judgment set aside simply by showing
that he was not served with citation" under Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 306a(4) and 329b or under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30,
governing restricted appeals.315 And finally, the Power court held that
the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the bill of re-
view plaintiff because he failed to pursue legal remedies such as a statu-
tory bill of review in section 31 of the Probate Code. 316
C. WRITS OF ERROR/RESTRICTED APPEALS
As petitioner learned in Quaestor Investments, Inc. v. State of Chiapas,
the six-month time limit for filing writs of error is mandatory and jurisdic-
tional.317 In this case, Quaestar took a default judgment against Chiapas
and began proceedings to collect the judgment. Chiapas removed the
lawsuit fourteen days before its six-month time limit for filing a writ of
error had expired. The federal court remanded the case, but Chiapas did
not file a writ of error with the court of appeals until after its Fifth Circuit
appeal of the remand order was dismissed.
Although both parties acknowledged that the removal suspended the
appellate timetable, they disagreed over when it began again. If it recom-
menced when the federal court entered its remand order, the writ of error
was untimely; conversely, if it began again after the Fifth Circuit dis-
missed the appeal of the remand order, the writ of error was timely. The
supreme court held that, because remanding a case to state court auto-
matically terminates the federal court's jurisdiction and because there is
no requirement that the state court take any action to reassert jurisdiction
after it receives a remand order, "jurisdiction revests in the state court
when the federal district court executes the remand order and mails a
certified copy to the state court. '318 Accordingly, the time for appealing
by writ of error expired fourteen days after the date jurisdiction was rein-
vested in the state court, and the writ of error filed by Chiapas was filed
too late. 319
D. LIMITED APPEALS
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 34.6, an appellant may
request a partial reporter's record to minimize the expense and delay of
the appellate process. The rule requires appellant to file and request for
the partial record and also mandates that the notice include a statement
of the issues to be appealed. In Jaramillo v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co.,320 the appellant sought to appeal a discrete evidentiary er-
315. Dispensa, 987 S.W.2d at 928.
316. See Power, 994 S.W.2d at 335.
317. See 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999) (citing Linton v. Smith, 154 S.W.2d 643, 645
(Tex. 1941).
318. Id. at 229.
319. See id. at 229.
320. See 986 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Eastland, 1998, no pet.).
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ror, and presumably desired to rely on a partial reporter's record on ap-
peal. But she neither filed and served a request for a partial reporter's
record on the opposing party nor stated the points of error on which she
would be relying. In light of the fact that appellant failed to comply with
rule 34.6, appellant was not entitled to the presumption that nothing
omitted from the record is relevant to the disposition of the appeal. Ac-
cordingly, because it was "unable to determine whether the errors com-
plained of by Jaramillo were harmful in the context of the entire case,"
the Eastland court refused to find error and affirmed the trial court's
decision. 321
E. DIRECT APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT
Section 22.001(c) of the Government Code permits parties to appeal
directly to the supreme court "an order of a trial court granting or deny-
ing an interlocutory or permanent injunction on the ground of the consti-
tutionality of a statute of this state. '322 Direct appeal was sought in
Owens Corning v. Carter,323 a case that involved the challenge of the con-
stitutionality of several statutes that had been recently enacted or
amended to: (1) curb forum shopping by nonresidents with claims arising
out of state, and (2) repeal the law that had prohibited courts from dis-
missing asbestos claims under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In
particular, section 71.052(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code required courts to grant all motions to dismiss asbestos claims filed
after January 1, 1997 by plaintiffs who resided outside of Texas when they
were exposed to asbestos outside of the state, as long as the defendant
stipulated that the filing of a claim in another forum would relate back to
the Texas filing for limitations purposes. 32 4
Owens Corning filed the requisite stipulations and moved to dismiss
the claims of several plaintiffs who resided outside of Texas when they
were allegedly exposed to asbestos.325 The plaintiffs filed a suit for de-
claratory and injunctive relief challenging the constitutionality of the stat-
utes on their own behalf and on behalf of the class of "all non-Texas
residents who have filed asbestos-related personal injury lawsuits in Texas
state courts on or after January 1, 1997."326 The trial court declared sec-
tion 71.031(a)(3) unconstitutional as applied and section 71.052(b) uncon-
stitutional on its face and issued an order enjoining defendants from
321. Id. at 702.
322. TEX. Gov'T CODE § 22.001(c) (Vernon 1988); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3-b.
323. 997 S.W.2d 560, 564-65 (Tex. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 500 (Nov. 15, 1999).
Senate Bill 220, which became effective May 29, 1997, addressed these concerns by amend-
ing sections 71.031 and 71.051 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and creating
section 71.052. See id. at 566.
324. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.052(b).
325. Owens Corning filed a counterclaim and motion for class certification involving
plaintiffs in four other suits. In response, the plaintiffs in those four suits sought an injunc-
tion to prevent defendants from attempting to enforce the statutes. Class certification was




seeking to enforce those provisions.32 7 Additionally, the court declared
section 71.052(c) unconstitutional as to a certain subset of plaintiffs and
enjoined the defendants from seeking to enforce that provision against
those plaintiffs.328
Owens Corning filed a direct appeal to the supreme court, arguing that
the Government Code gave that court jurisdiction to review the trial
court's order enjoining defendants from seeking to enforce sections
71.031(a)(3), 71.052(b), and 71.052(c). Plaintiffs argued that the supreme
court did not have jurisdiction because "the purported injunctive relief
granted by the trial court below was actually no more than declaratory
judgment under another name. ' 329 They reasoned that the injunctions
had no force and effect independent of the trial court's interlocutory de-
claratory judgments, and were, therefore, insufficient to confer direct ap-
peal jurisdiction.
The supreme court held that it had jurisdiction over the direct ap-
peal.330 It reasoned that, although the plaintiffs received the injunction
only on their own behalf, they sought that relief on their own behalf and
on behalf of the putative class. The court held: "The trial court issued
orders granting and denying injunctive relief on the grounds of the consti-
tutionality of Senate Bill 220, and each party has appealed. As such, the
requirements of section 22.001(c) are satisfied."' 331
F. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
During the Annual Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court held that a
party seeking judicial review of a Texas Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion Appeals Panel decision complies with the Texas Labor Code's ap-
peal procedure by sending their petition for judicial review to the
Commission by first-class United States mail on the day it is due. 332 In
reaching this conclusion, the court ruled that rule 5 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure-the "mailbox rule"-applies to the provision of the
Texas Labor Code governing judicial review actions involving compen-
sability or eligibility for income or death benefits, despite a Commission
rule dictating that documents are timely filed with the Commission only if
the Commission receives them "before or during business hours on the
last permissible day to file."'333 The court reasoned that the Commission
rules did not apply because the Workers' Compensation Act specifically
directs that judicial review actions involving "compensability or eligibility
for or the amount of income or death benefits" are governed by sub-




330. See Owens Corning, 997 S.W.2d at 568.
331. Id.
332. Albertson's, Inc. v. Sinclair, 984 S.W.2d 958, 960-61 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
333. Id. at 960. See also TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.301 (Vernon 1996); 28 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 102.7 (Vernon 1999).
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when subchapter G conflicts with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,
subchapter G controls. 334 Because the mailbox rule did not conflict with
subchapter G, the court concluded, "it applies to subchapter G judicial
review actions. '335
XIV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
In G.E. American Communication v. Galveston Central Appraisal Dis-
trict,336 a taxpayer appealed to seeking review of a local appraisal board's
determination of the valuation of some of the taxpayer's property. The
court of appeals discussed the proper standard of review to be applied by
the trial court in its review of an appraisal board's disposition of a tax-
payer's correction motion 337 brought under section 25.25 of the Texas Tax
Code.338
After the appraisal district valued the taxpayer's property, the taxpayer
disagreed with the valuation and challenged it by filing a motion to cor-
rect a substantial error. After holding a hearing, the appraisal review
board denied the taxpayer's motion. The taxpayer then filed suit in dis-
trict court to compel the appraisal review board to order a change in the
appraisal roll. The appraisal district and appraisal review board moved
for and were granted summary judgment on the ground that the taxpayer
"could not raise the issue of valuation in a section 25.2 5 (g) lawsuit. '339
On appeal, the taxpayer argued that section 25.25 of the Tax Code340
provides for a trial de novo and that the trial court erred by failing to
conduct any substantive review of the appraisal review board's decision.
The court of appeals identified and discussed the four types of review
from administrative decisions recognized under Texas law:
(1) pure trial de novo (in which the reviewing tribunal conducts an
independent factfinding proceeding where new evidence is taken
and all issues are determined anew, and the reviewing body substi-
tutes its discretion for that of the agency); 341
334. Albertson's, 984 S.W.2d at 960-61. See 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 102.7 (Vernon
1999); TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 410.301, 410.305 (Vernon 1996); TEX. R. CIv. P. 5.
335. Albertson's, 984 S.W.2d at 960-61. The court further held that, while timely filing
with the Commission is mandatory, it is not jurisdictional. See id. at 961-62. Accord Ector
County Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Adkins, 989 S.W.2d 363, 363 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Bena-
videz v. Travelers Indem. Co., 985 S.W.2d 458, 458 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Ortiz v. Insur-
ance Co. of State of Pa., 988 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
336. 979 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
337. A correction motion is "designed to correct clerical errors and substantial judicial
errors which resulted in the appraised value of the property exceeding by more than one-
third the correct market value of the property." Id. at 763-64, (citing TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 25.25(d) (Vernon 1992)).
338. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25 (Vernon 1992).
339. See G.E. American, 979 S.W.2d at 763.
340. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.25 (Vernon 1992).
341. See Sanchez v. Huntsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 844 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. App.-Hous-




(2) pure substantial evidence (in which the agency's decision is pre-
sumptively legal and valid and the reviewing tribunal looks only at
the record made before the agency or board to determine whether
the agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence); 342
(3) substantial evidence de novo (in which the agency's decision is pre-
sumed legal and valid, but the reviewing tribunal may hear any evi-
dence in existence at the time of the administrative hearing
regardless of whether it was introduced at the administrative hear-
ing);343 and
(4) a special rate-case classification referred to as de novo fact trial
(which is similar to trial de novo, but the agency's decision is ad-
missible at trial). 344
The taxpayer in contending that pure trial de novo is the applicable
standard of review, relied on a recent amendment to section 42.01 of the
Tax Code,345 effective on January 1, 1998. The significance of the amend-
ment, the taxpayer argued, was that it clarified the legislature's intent that
district court review of motions to correct under chapter 42 of the Tax
Code was intended to be by trial de novo.
The court of appeals, observing that the legislature did not intend the
amendment to apply retroactively to review proceedings occurring prior
to the amendment, concluded that the legislature intended for proceed-
ings brought under section 25.25 to function "as traditional appeal[s] and
not merely as safeguard[s] insuring the observance of procedural due pro-
cess."' 346 As a result, the court held, in reversing the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, that "an appeal under Section 25.25(g) requires a
substantive review of the proceedings and decision of the appraisal re-
view board. ' 347 Rejecting the taxpayer's argument that pure trial de
novo was the appropriate standard of review before the Tax Code amend-
ment, the court of appeals held that the correct standard of review for
proceedings under section 25.25(g) is substantial evidence de novo:
We conclude, therefore, that a district court must review an appraisal
review board's order to ensure the board reached a reasonable deci-
sion. In conducting this review, the court may hear any and all evi-
dence in existence at the time of the administrative hearing. The
reviewing tribunal may also examine the order to ensure it was not
tainted by fraud, bad faith or abuse of discretion, and to ensure that
342. See Imperial Am. Res. Fund, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex.
1977); Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986).
343. See Board of Trustees of Big Spring Firemen's Relief and Retirement Fund v. Fire-
men's Pension Comm'r, 808 S.W,2d 608, 612 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
344. See James R. Eissinger, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Contested Cases
Under APTRA, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 11 (1990).
345. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon Supp. 1998) ("A property owner is entitled
to appeal: (1) an order of the appraisal review board determining: (A) a protest by the
property owner as provided by Subchapter C of Chapter 41; or (B) a determination of an
appraisal review board on a motion filed under Section 25.25)..
346. G.E. American, 979 S.W.2d at 766.
347. Id. at 766.
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due process was afforded to the parties.3 48
During the Annual Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court in Rodri-
guez v. Service Lloyds Insurance Co.349 clarified that, in workers' com-
pensation disputes involving compensability or eligibility for or the
amount of income or death benefits, the employee may appeal a Com-
mission appeals panel decision to the district court in the employee's
county of residence. The court then reviews the decision under "a modi-
fied de novo standard. ' 350 If the dispute concerns something other than
compensability or eligibility for or the amount of income or death bene-
fits, an appeal of the decision must be filed in the district court in Travis
County under the Administrative Procedure Act, and "substantial evi-
dence" is the standard for judicial review.351
It is well-settled that the standard for reviewing a trial court's decision
on a motion for reinstatement under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
165a(3) is whether the plaintiff established that the failure or omission
that led to dismissal of the case "was not intentional or the result of con-
scious indifference but was due to an accident or mistake or that the fail-
ure has been otherwise reasonably explained. '352 During the Annual
Survey period, Justice Hecht dissented from the denial of the petition for
review in Rampart Capital Corp. v. Maguire,35 3 stating that he would have
granted the petition to clarify the standard for reinstatement that applies
when a case is dismissed under the trial court's inherent power. Accord-
ing to Justice Hecht, the standard for reinstatement when dismissal is pur-
suant to the trial court's inherent power should be the same standard as
that applied when the case is dismissed under rule 165a(3), which is es-
sentially the same as that for setting aside a default judgment. 354
Also during the Survey period, the Beaumont Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the availability on appeal of an evidentiary review of an individ-
ual element of damages where the jury question called for a total amount
as to all elements of damages.355 The court concluded that the only way a
"defendant can successfully attack a multi-element damages award on ap-
348. Id. at 767.
349. 997 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
350. Id. at 253.
351. See id.
352. TEX. R. Civ. P. 165a(3); Smith v. Babcock & Wilcox Constr. Co., Inc., 913 S.W.2d
467, 468 (Tex. 1995).
353. 1 S.W.3d 106 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J., dissenting).
354. See id. at 106-07. Justice Hecht noted that a number of Texas courts of appeals
have held that a different standard applies, but have failed to explain what alternative
reinstatement standard should apply. Id. at n.7 (citing Burton v. Hoffman, 959 S.W.2d 351,
354 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet.); Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 408-09 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1995, writ denied); Eustice v. Grandy's, 827 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1992, no writ); Goff v. Branch, 821 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991,
writ denied); Ozuna v. Southwest Bio-Clinical Labs., 766 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1989, writ denied); Moore v. Armour & Co., Inc., 748 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ); Speck v. Ford Motor Co., 709 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
355. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Ard, 991 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, rule
53.7(f) motion filed).
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peal is to address each and every element and show that not a single
element is supported by sufficient evidence. ' 356 If just one element of
damages is supported by the evidence, the aggregate award will be af-
firmed if it is supported by the evidence. 357
XV. DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
When a party presents multiple grounds for reversal of a judgment on
appeal, "the appellate court should first address those points that would
afford the party the greatest relief. '358 Essentially, this means that the
court of appeals should decide rendition issues before reaching issues that
would require a remand. In fact, rule 43.3 of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure incorporates this principle. 359 According to the supreme
court, this principle is mandatory and the courts of appeals are not at
liberty to disregard it.3 60 Accordingly, a court of appeals errs by not de-
ciding a rendition issue before an issue that would result in a remand.
The nature of the error before the court of appeals, of course, deter-
mines whether the appellate court can address the problem itself by mod-
ifying and rendering an appropriate judgment, or whether the case must
be remanded to the trial court. For example, while a "clerical" error
made by the trial court in reducing a settlement agreement to a written
judgment may be corrected by modification of that judgment in the court
of appeals, a "judicial" error must be reversed and remanded to the trial
court for entry of an agreed judgment that conforms to the terms of the
parties' agreement.361
XVI. SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The supreme court has jurisdiction to determine whether the court of
356. See id. at 520 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co., Inc. v. Zrubeck, 850 S.W.2d
579, 589 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
357. See id. The Ard court rejected Texas Indus., Inc. v. Vaughan, 919 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) and Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d
81, 87-88 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1992, no writ) to the extent they are inconsistent with
Zrubeck. See Ard, 991 S.W.2d at 522.
358. Bradleys' Elec., Inc. v. Cigna Lloyds Ins. Co., 995 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1999) (per
curiam).
359. Rule 43.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
43.3 Rendition Appropriate Unless Remand Necessary. When reversing a
trial court's judgment, the court must render the judgment that the trial court
should have rendered, except when:
(a) a remand is necessary for further proceedings; or
(b) the interests of justice require a remand for another trial.
TEX. R. ApP. P. 43.3.
360. See Bradleys' Elec., 995 S.W.2d at 677.
361. See Patel v. Eagle Pass Pediatric Health Clinic, Inc., 985 S.W.2d 249, 252 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). Similarly, a trial court's error in awarding uncondi-
tional attorney's fees on appeal does not require remand; rather, the court of appeals can
modify the trial court's judgment to condition the award of attorney's fees on appeal to
appellees' success on appeal. See Stable Energy, L.P. v. Newberry, 999 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
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appeals correctly decided its jurisdiction over an appeal.362 The supreme
court also has the power to stay enforcement of a trial court order pend-
ing the court of appeals' review of the order to prevent the appeal from
becoming moot.363 A temporary stay of this nature issued by the su-
preme court does not divest the court of appeals of jurisdiction to review
the order at issue; rather, the stay preserves the issues from becoming
moot so they can be reviewed by that court.364
362. See H & R Block, Inc. v. Haese, 992 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam).
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